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SCARLET-LETTERED BANKRUPTCY:
A PUBLIC BENEFIT PROPOSAL FOR MASS
TORT VILLAINS
Samir D. Parikh
ABSTRACT—Financially distressed companies often seek refuge in federal
bankruptcy court to auction valuable assets and pay creditor claims. Mass
tort defendants—including 3M, Johnson & Johnson, and Purdue Pharma—
introduce new complexities to customary Chapter 11 dynamics. Many mass
tort defendants engage in malfeasance that inflicts widespread harm. These
debtors fuel public scorn and earn a scarlet letter that can destroy value for
an otherwise profitable business. Scarlet-lettered companies could file for
bankruptcy and quickly sell their assets to fund victims’ settlement trusts.
This Article argues, however, that this traditional resolution option would
eviscerate victim recoveries. Harsh public scrutiny has diminished the value
of the resources necessary to satisfy claims, creating a discount that must be
borne by victims.
My public benefit proposal charts a new course. Instead of accepting
fire-sale prices and an underfunded settlement trust, the scarlet-lettered
company emerges from bankruptcy as a corporation for the public benefit.
This modified reorganization offers victims the greatest recovery. The
continued operation preserves value during a transition period, after which
the going concern can be sold efficiently. Assets that have been tainted by
tortious conduct are cleansed behind a philanthropy shield and then sold to
capture the value rebound. The victims’ collective is the owner of the new
company and can participate in a shareholder windfall if there is strong
postbankruptcy performance.
At the forefront of a new trend in aggregate litigation, this Article
proposes a public benefit alternative to traditional resolution mechanisms.
This approach delivers utility that will support application in a variety of
contexts, assuming certain governance safeguards are maintained. In our
new age of greater personal and corporate accountability, more scarletlettered companies will emerge and ultimately land in bankruptcy. The need
to address the disposition of tainted assets will be paramount in
compensating mass tort victims trying to reassemble fractured pieces. This
Article explains a new phenomenon and reconceptualizes resolution
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dynamics in a way that will have policy implications that transcend
aggregate litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Robert Kaiko did not intend to cause a national health crisis. The
doctor was Purdue Pharma’s vice president of clinical research in 1990.1 The
company’s patent on MS Contin had just expired,2 and competition from
generic manufacturers was going to decimate profits.3 The executive team
had been given the daunting task of saving the company.
On July 16, 1990, Dr. Kaiko wrote a pedestrian memorandum that had
a radical proposal: Purdue should formulate a new pain medication based on
the opioid oxycodone.4 Oxycodone had a number of benefits, including the
ability to facilitate stable pain management.5 Kaiko believed that no other
pharmaceutical firm was developing pain medication incorporating the
drug.6 Thus, a “controlled-release oxycodone [would be] less likely to
initially have generic competition.”7 Purdue would enjoy a first-mover
1 Harriet Ryan, Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ OxyContin’s
12-Hour Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/
[https://perma.cc/7LPD-T7W7].
2 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Institutions and the Opioid Crisis, 7 J.L.
BIOSCIENCES 1, 8 (2020).
3
See Christopher Glazek, The Secretive Family Making Billions from the Opioid Crisis,
ESQUIRE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12775932/sackler-family-oxycontin/
[https://perma.cc/C7ER-UVS6].
4 See Purdue’s Need for a New Painkiller, L.A. TIMES: OXYCONTIN FILES (May 5, 2016),
https://documents.latimes.com/purdues-need-new-painkiller-1990/ [https://perma.cc/5PAY-J9HT].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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premium. But there was one serious concern. Oxycodone can be up to twice
as potent as morphine, and—even at that time—some states had identified
the drug as one of the most abused narcotics in the country.8
Kaiko’s proposal presented significant ethical questions, but not to
Richard Sackler. Sackler believed that oxycodone’s addiction gravity was an
opportunity, not a moral quandary.9 Purdue executives knew that medical
professionals misunderstood oxycodone because of a convenient
malapropism.10 Many physicians confused the suffix “-codone” with
“codeine,” a mild pain suppressant prevalent in various over-the-counter
products.11 Purdue could manufacture one of the most addictive drugs in
medical history and rely on a creative marketing campaign to obscure this
fact. Sackler believed that sales would be staggering if he could just get the
product in patients’ hands.12 He was right.
OxyContin prescriptions during the drug’s 1996 launch year exceeded
300,000.13 By 2001, prescriptions exceeded six million.14 Sales topped $1
billion for that year alone.15 By 2004, OxyContin was the most prevalent
prescription opioid abused in the United States.16 By the end of the 2000s,
Americans—who represent less than 5% of the world’s population—were
consuming more than 80% of the world’s opioids.17 Purdue is not solely
responsible for the opioid crisis, but it developed the fountainhead drug and
depraved distribution strategies that others in the industry would follow.18
Purdue’s day of reckoning did not come for many years. But in a
previous generation, the company may not have answered for its depravity
at all. The change can be attributed to a newfound sense of personal and
corporate accountability.19 As I discuss in Section II.A, infra, online social

8 See id. (noting that “in the state of Connecticut and perhaps other states, the substance abuse
officials consider oxycodone combinations among the most abused of Schedule II narcotic
analgesic drugs”).
9 See Glazek, supra note 3.
10 See id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Bethany McLean, “We Didn’t Cause the Crisis”: David Sackler Pleads His Case on the
Opioid Epidemic, VANITY FAIR (June 19, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/06/davidsackler-pleads-his-case-on-the-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/V59L-EBFR].
17 Id.
18 See Samir D. Parikh, The New Mass Torts Bargain, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649611 [https://perma.cc/F9GX-FWPT]; infra
notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 109.

428

117:425 (2022)

Scarlet-Lettered Bankruptcy

networks have enabled young people to mobilize and demand action in
response to the perceived inability of traditional institutions to prevent
criminal behavior. The result is increased scrutiny on a broad cross-section
of individuals and corporate entities, from Bill Cosby to Johnson & Johnson.
Evil is in the spotlight. And criminal prosecution is not enough. Victims need
financial compensation, but the most daunting resolution obstacles exist in
this sphere.20
This Article offers a theoretical analysis of the resolution complexity
facing a unique subset of mass tort defendants I refer to as “scarlet-lettered
companies.” These companies have inflicted harm on a significant segment
of the population. But it is the scale and depravity of their tortious conduct
that creates deep-seated public scorn, earning each one a scarlet letter that
can ultimately destroy an otherwise profitable business. Unfortunately, this
punishment harms mass tort victims, whose recovery is invariably tied to the
liquidation of tainted corporate assets.
Scarlet-lettered companies could file for bankruptcy and quickly sell
their assets to fund a settlement trust to compensate victims. The strategy
involves conducting an auction and using the proceeds—along with funds
provided by affiliated corporate entities or applicable insurance policies—to
establish a victims’ trust that would ultimately receive, analyze, and pay
claims related to the debtor’s pre-petition tortious conduct.21 The literature
on bankruptcy asset sales has touted the process’s ability to efficiently
preserve value for creditors.22 But historical models fail to capture massrestructuring dynamics.

20

See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
See Parikh, supra note 18, at 34–36.
22 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 223 (1986)
(describing the flexibility benefits of Chapter 7 bankruptcy); see also Michael C. Jensen, Corporate
Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 13, 31–32 (1991) (“The auction process
would thus have two major advantages over the current system. First, it would separate the task of
assessing the firm’s value from that of dividing that value among creditors and equityholders, effectively
assigning the first to capital markets and the second to the courts. Second, it would shelter the value of
the firm’s operations from the destructive conflicts among creditors and equityholders over the division
of firm value—conflicts that make the current formal bankruptcy process so inefficient.”); Douglas G.
Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 71–72 (2004) (describing how
sales can protect smaller investors and maximize the price the assets fetch); Douglas G. Baird & Robert
K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685–93 (2003) [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, Chapter 11] (asserting that “asset sales are a way to preserve what going-concern value may
exist by putting the corporation’s assets into new hands”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777–88 (2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen,
Bankruptcy] (describing the modern state of going-concern sales). But see Lynn LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (challenging Baird and
Rasmussen’s assertion in The End of Bankruptcy that markets are the most viable substitute for the
reorganization process).
21
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Scarlet-lettered companies face harsh public scrutiny, which creates a
residual stain that diminishes the value of the very resources necessary to
provide victims an equitable recovery. Rushed bankruptcy auctions can
preserve value in many cases, allocating a speed premium to creditors.
Scarlet-lettered auctions do not enjoy this premium. These auctions face a
staggering speed discount because public scorn and the fear of social norms
deter bidder entry and promote cautionary bidding. The consequences of a
rushed, scarlet-lettered auction are severe.23 An inefficient auction realizes
diminished proceeds, increasing the risk of a prematurely insolvent victims’
trust—the only source of recovery for mass tort victims. Bankruptcy’s dirty
little secret is that these trusts have no backstop upon failure.24 The corporate
tortfeasor is liquidated and no longer exists. Insurance companies, the parent
entity, and affiliated entities all receive releases through the case.
Professionals and other intermediaries who may have agreed to a poor
settlement have immunity. If the debtor’s assets were auctioned, the acquirer
does not assume any pre-petition liability. Victims have ostensibly no
recourse. I argue, however, that a doomed auction is not the only option.
My public benefit proposal charts a new course. Instead of accepting
fire-sale prices and an underfunded settlement trust, the scarlet-lettered
company would emerge from bankruptcy as a corporation for the public
benefit, effectuating an equitable balance by deploying the company that has
done evil to solve that evil. Further, this proposal arguably offers victims the
greatest recovery by rejecting a rushed asset sale. The continued operation
preserves value during a transition period. Over time, the residual stain
evaporates, and the new corporation can conduct an auction in a more
favorable bidding environment, ideally within three to five years. In other
words, tainted assets are cleansed behind a philanthropy shield and sold after
a value rebound. The public benefit model is preferable to a traditional
reorganization because a simple rebranding will not address asset taint or
harsh public scrutiny. My proposal helps a business reestablish its reputation
among consumers and other disparate constituents whose buy-in is needed
23

For example, in Purdue, a rushed auction was expected to produce ostensibly no recovery for
victims. See infra Section III.B; see also Declaration of Michael Atkinson in Support of the Statement of
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Support of Confirmation of the Sixth Amended Joint
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 32, In re Purdue
Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) [hereinafter Purdue UCC Plan Support Letter]
(explaining that, during the bankruptcy case, Purdue actively sought a potential acquirer of its assets; only
one bidder was identified, and that bidder’s offer was still too low to receive serious consideration).
24 These trusts are designed to avoid exhausting all funds. Once the trust’s administrators determine
that the trust lacks sufficient funds to pay projected claims, distributions will invariably be reduced.
Therefore, a situation could arise in which initial claimants receive eighty cents on the dollar for their
claims, but future claimants receive virtually nothing. In that situation, the trust has not technically
exhausted all funds, but I describe it as “failing.”
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to maximize enterprise value. Most important, victims are able to participate
in a shareholder windfall if the reorganized company experiences strong
postbankruptcy performance.
As I discuss in Part II, we are at the forefront of a developing trend.
There are only a few cases so far—most notably Purdue and the bankruptcy
of Johnson & Johnson’s talc subsidiary—but more are emerging, including
cases involving drug distributors who contributed to the opioid crisis, cell
phone manufacturers who may have concealed the risks of extended phone
use, and producers of tainted infant formula.25
This Article seeks to make three contributions to the legal literature on
mass torts and financial restructuring. Primarily, this Article is the first to
identify scarlet-lettered companies and conceptualize the resolution
complexity that these companies pose. Second, this Article offers the public
benefit proposal, a comprehensive normative approach to improving
recoveries for mass tort victims by assembling existing statutory options in
an unprecedented construct. No statutory modifications or new pieces of
legislation are necessary; this is one of the proposal’s key features. Finally,
the legal literature has overlooked the idea of scarlet-lettered companies and
the need for alternative, value-preservation models. Mass tort bankruptcies
present some of the most meaningful and challenging legal issues in the
country today, but there is very little scholarship addressing these
interdisciplinary disputes. I hope to engage scholars from various disciplines
to explore improvements to and novel applications of my proposal.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I lays out the doctrinal
framework for bankruptcy auctions and why this seemingly efficient process
produces anomalistic yields. Part II introduces the idea of scarlet-lettered
companies and the unique social dynamics that bring criminals to justice but
then ultimately eviscerate the value of the corporate assets necessary to
compensate victims. Rushed auctions produce meager proceeds, raising the
risk of a prematurely insolvent victims’ trust and unsatisfied claims. Part III
explores the public benefit proposal’s details and ultimate utility. The
proposal seeks to efficiently dispose of scarlet-lettered assets and thereby
sufficiently fund the victims’ settlement trust. To accomplish these two
objectives, the proposal first envisions a deferred auction to create a delay
premium that is allocated to victims. The second component is the creation
of a public benefit corporation designed to secure stakeholder buy-in and
cleanse tainted assets. Finally, the proposal embraces state law to impose
rigorous governance safeguards designed to ensure fidelity to the new
company’s financial and societal goals.
25

For more on each of these developing cases, see infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
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In an age of greater personal and corporate accountability, I expect
more scarlet-lettered companies landing in bankruptcy to address the
disposition of tainted assets. My public benefit proposal offers a
comprehensive normative approach designed to protect mass tort victims. In
the aggregate litigation symphony, this Article represents the initial notes of
a new movement.
I.

BANKRUPTCY AUCTIONS AND ANOMALISTIC YIELD

Well into the twentieth century, leading economists argued that supply
and demand forces determined sale outcomes.26 If true, elaborate protocols
would not increase the likelihood of revenue maximization in auctions.27 In
fact, attendant transaction costs could suppress the realized price in any given
sale. In the 1960s, Professor William Vickrey and others began pushing back
on this theory, exploring the game-theoretic aspects of auctions28 and
organizing theoretical studies to assess participant behavior and outcomes.29
This research ultimately established that various sale features, including
price levels, are materially affected by auction design.30 Innovative protocols
can enhance bidding and produce greater revenue.
Today, economic literature asserts that auctions—when designed
properly—are the optimal means to secure the highest price for many asset
classes.31 In the years since the first spectrum license auction,32 governments
26 See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM, PRIZE LECTURES ON WILLIAM VICKREY: PROCURING UNIVERSAL
SERVICE: PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK 383 (1996), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/
2018/06/vickrey_lecture_milgrom.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCS4-JDFP]; see also GERARD DEBREU,
THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM 43–47 (1959).
27 See MILGROM, supra note 26, at 382–83 (explaining that neoclassical theory “implicitly assumes
that the particular rules governing how bids and offers are combined to determine prices and allocations
ultimately [have] no effect on market outcomes”).
28 I use the term “auction” broadly to capture any process in which the specific terms of a proposed
sale, including price, are invariably determined by a comparison of bids.
29 See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN.
8, 8–9 (1961); James H. Griesmer, Richard E. Levitan & Martin Shubik, Toward a Study of Bidding
Processes Part IV–Games with Unknown Costs, 14 NAVAL RSCH. LOGISTICS Q. 415, 415–16 (1967);
Robert B. Wilson, Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information, 15 MGMT. SCI. 446, 446 (1969).
30 See Vickrey, supra note 29, at 20–23.
31 Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, Efficient Auctions and Interdependent
Types, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 319, 319 (2012). Auction theory’s details are beyond this Article’s scope,
but there are numerous instructive primers. See, e.g., VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY (2d ed. 2010);
PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004); Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in
Auction Design, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 169 (2002).
32 In the 1990s, economists put theory into practice. The Federal Communications Commission was
given the authority to do something it had never done before: auction radio spectrum licenses. Peter
Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 727, 727–28 (1998). The agency
sought a value-maximizing design for these sales and approached Professors Robert Wilson and Paul
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have embraced auction theory and now regularly employ bespoke auctions
to allocate a panoply of assets, including licenses, marketable securities,
mineral rights, oil and gas leases, timber rights, and electricity production.33
A significant body of auction literature has developed around these types of
sales. But auction theory’s basic principles apply in many other contexts,
including asset sales in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy scholars have similarly embraced the idea of auction utility,
touting Section 363(b) asset sales as a market alternative to judicial
valuation.34 These sales have become the predominant means of disposing of
assets35 in corporate bankruptcy.36 In the early 2000s, asset-sale frequency
increased dramatically.37 Some scholars recognized the new trend and the
possibility that asset sales were optimal.38 Scholars argued that these sales
were frequently preferable to resource-intensive Chapter 11 reorganizations
that relied on the debtor convincing key stakeholders to support a revised
business model.39

Milgrom for optimal auction protocols. The resultant auction and many others that would follow were
wildly successful, spawning a robust canon of auction scholarship. See MILGROM, supra note 26, at 383.
33 See, e.g., Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,
50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982) (securities); Christopher N. Osher, Federal Plan to Auction Mineral
Rights near Great Sands Dunes National Park Opposed by Environmentalists, DENVER POST (Mar. 9,
2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/09/great-sand-dunes-national-park-mineral-rights-auction/
[https://perma.cc/6837-97LM] (minerals); Oliver Milman, US Auctions Off Oil and Gas Drilling Leases
in Gulf of Mexico After Climate Talks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/nov/17/biden-administration-gulf-of-mexico-oil-gas-drilling-leases [https://perma.cc/MCZ6BV7L] (oil and gas); Colin Doran & Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Neighboring Parties on the Value
of Rights: Evidence from Timber Harvests, 88 S. ECON. J. 705, 711–13 (2021) (timber); Hughes v. Talen
Energy Marketing, 578 U.S. 150, 154–57 (2016) (electricity).
34 See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice
Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 889 (2014);
11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
35 This Article discusses the sale of “assets.” That term captures all types of property, including
personal, real, and intellectual, as well as entire going-concern businesses.
36 See Yaad Rotem & Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auction as a Game—Designing an Optimal
Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 REV. LITIG. 323, 325 (2013).
37 See
FLORIDA-UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, https://lopucki.law.ufl.edu/
design_a_study_percent_by_year.php [https://perma.cc/6PCS-39DU] (showing only six auctions
involving large public companies in the 1980s, but over 140 in the period from 2000 to 2010). Naturally,
most bankruptcy asset sales do not involve large public companies, but the spike in auction popularity
was realized across corporate debtor types.
38 See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11, supra note 22, at 674–78; Baird & Rasmussen, Bankruptcy,
supra note 22, at 751; see also JACKSON, supra note 22, at 223.
39 See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11, supra note 22, at 674–78; Baird & Rasmussen, Bankruptcy,
supra note 22, at 751.
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Despite this prominence, there is limited bankruptcy scholarship that
explores auction design,40 and virtually no scholarship considering the sale
of volatile assets or alternative disposition measures when neither an auction
nor the traditional reorganization process is optimal for an otherwisevaluable entity. Muted in the current discussion is the fact that the
ubiquitous bankruptcy auction is rarely efficient41 and frequently the worst
option available.
A. Auction Mechanics and Benefits
Bankruptcy architecture provides three primary resolution options for
corporate debtors. A debtor can restructure its business by using the
Bankruptcy Code’s various forms of relief and emerge as a reorganized
entity, usually with a new ownership group, business model, and capital
structure. A debtor may also sell its business as a going concern through
Section 363 of the Code or a plan of reorganization. Finally, a debtor can
terminate its business and liquidate valuable parts. For the last two options,
sale proceeds are used to address creditor claims.42
In order to maximize proceeds, bankruptcy auctions must minimize
transaction costs and facilitate active bidder participation.43 The debtor who
40

There are a few bankruptcy scholars that explore the issue. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 861–63 (1994); Bruce A.
Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69,
73–74 (1991). But recent scholarship invariably focuses on a secured creditor’s ability to “credit bid” its
claim at the auction. See infra note 76; Alan N. Resnick, Denying Secured Creditors the Right to Credit
Bid in Chapter 11 Cases and the Risk of Undervaluation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 323, 329 (2012); Vincent S.
J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 99, 100 (2010). Economics literature has been far more active in exploring bankruptcy auction
design. See, e.g., Jordan B. Neyland & Kathryn A. St. John, Hidden Wealth Transfers in Bankruptcy Asset
Sales: A Real Option Analysis, 19 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 46 (2022); Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 327;
Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep Singh, The Resolution of Bankruptcy by Auction: Allocating the
Residual Right of Design, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 270 (1999).
41 Many economists describe an auction as being “efficient” when an asset is transferred to the bidder
who values that asset the most. This perspective is particularly useful in cases of privatization—when a
state-owned asset is being sold into the private sector. In these cases, an allocation may be “efficient”
even if an alternative auction process would have produced a higher realized price. See Partha Dasgupta
& Eric Maskin, Efficient Auctions, 115 Q.J. ECON. 341, 341–42 (2000). However, the idea of an
“efficient” auction has evolved differently in bankruptcy. The Creditors’ Bargain is one of the
foundational theories of bankruptcy and provides, in part, that the ultimate process goal is to maximize
the distribution to the creditor collective. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy Entitlements,
and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 836–43 (1985).
This Article adopts this perspective. Consequently, as used here, a bankruptcy auction is “efficient”
if it is unlikely that an alternative choice would produce a higher realized price and increased distribution
to creditors.
42 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 5.
43 See Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 364–66.
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believes that an asset sale will produce the greatest value for the estate is
tasked with preparing auction protocols, which will include some procedures
that are characteristic of almost every auction and some that are peculiar to
bankruptcy. The key auction facets are the identity of the stalking-horse
bidder and the initial bid price.44 Auction protocols will also provide overbid
requirements, diligence periods, qualifying procedures for other bidders, and
the break-up fee owed to the stalking-horse bidder if that party is not chosen
as the auction’s winner. The debtor is tasked with establishing the auction
format, but an ascending-bid auction is always chosen.45
A bankruptcy auction is extremely attractive in theory. The process
offers an accelerated redeployment of the debtor’s assets through an
ostensibly free market process that requires limited court involvement.46
Bankruptcy auctions impose numerous rules, but the clear structure is
intended to reduce transaction costs and encourage bidder entry.47 The
auction can involve one asset or an entire going concern. Bolstering the
process is the fact that the sale cuts off legacy liability; assets are sold free
and clear of liabilities and other interests.48
As noted above, the debtor is tasked with formulating the bidding
procedures. Once approved by the bankruptcy court, these procedures are
rarely subject to revision, and the seller cannot arbitrarily halt the
process.49 Bankruptcy auctions—some of which involve multibillion-dollar
corporations—can occur just a few months after the bankruptcy filing. This
accelerated timeline can be extremely valuable when a company is

44 The stalking-horse bidder is a party that evaluates the assets prior to the auction and agrees with
the debtor to purchase the assets at the initial bid price. Id. at 341.
45 For more on ascending-bid auctions, or “English” auctions, see infra Section I.B.1.a.
46 See generally JACKSON, supra note 22, at 219 (explaining that robust capital markets enhance the
efficiency of bankruptcy asset sales); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986) (touting bankruptcy asset sales as a market redeployment with limited
bankruptcy court involvement).
47 We see this dynamic in various contexts, including highly regulated markets. For example, in
commodity exchanges, the rules put in place may appear to restrain participation, but in fact help to reduce
transaction costs and ultimately increase trading volume. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW 9–10 (1988). Bankruptcy auction design is informed by lessons in these contexts.
48 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Distress,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 737 (2019) (explaining how bankruptcy courts have permitted “the extinction
not only of in rem interests, such as security interests and mortgages, but also personal liability under
successor liability theories”); Baird & Rasmussen, Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 786–87 (noting that
“[s]everal obstacles stand in the way” of cutting off legacy liability outside of bankruptcy).
49 See generally Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 348 (“Everybody knows that the auction is run
under a deadline and cannot be postponed.”). Outside of bankruptcy, directors’ fiduciary duties compel
them to abandon negotiations in the event they receive a higher bid from another party. See, e.g., Randall
S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, A Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneers’ Liability Regimes,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1156–57 (1992).
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deteriorating rapidly.50 Speed preserves value in these cases, and this speed
premium can be allocated to creditors instead of dissipating as a contested
case languishes. Speed also helps reduce administration costs and avoids
funds unnecessarily going to attorneys and other professionals managing the
bankruptcy case.51
With judicial approval, the auction can occur outside the debtor’s
ordinary course of business and without creditor consent. There are few
creditor protections, and auctions can proceed if the court determines that a
valid business justification supports the sale.52 The bankruptcy court’s
involvement engenders certainty.53 And the ruling approving the sale is
invariably final. Unlike other court processes, the bankruptcy code provides
that a sale of assets is unaffected by an appellate court reversing or modifying
the auction ruling as long as the winning bidder was found to have acted in
good faith and the sale was not stayed by the bankruptcy court pending

50

Jacoby & Janger, supra note 34, at 862.
See, e.g., Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 260 (2012) (stating
that “[f]rom an efficiency perspective, such 363 sales offer a number of advantages over a traditional
reorganization”).
52 Auctions are unaffected by the extensive creditor protections mandated in the plan confirmation
process. See Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for Sweetheart Deals
Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 249, 250, 256–57 (2006). Many of the
customary creditor safeguards we see in a plan process do not exist in a Section 363(b) sale or are often
disregarded. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A] § 363(b) sale might
evade such requirements as disclosure, solicitation, acceptance, and confirmation of a plan.”).
53 See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LITERATURE
699, 703–04 (1987) (explaining that institutions like courts of law can add value to the auction process
by, at the very least, preventing parties from reneging on auction commitments).
51
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appeal.54 Sale proceeds are distributed to creditors pursuant to prebankruptcy
entitlements.55
Section 363 promises a distressed company the possibility of separating
valuable assets from attendant debts and liabilities while relying on the
Bankruptcy Code and a bankruptcy judge to determine how proceeds should
be allocated.56 However, amidst all these valuable features, structural and
procedural deficiencies plague the process and suppress creditor recoveries
in many cases.
B. Auction Infirmities
Despite being an extremely popular option for debtors, bankruptcy
auctions are often inefficient. In their seminal article Bankruptcy Fire Sales,
Professors Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty compared recoveries in
bankruptcy cases that auctioned a going concern with those relying on a
restructuring through a plan of reorganization.57 Their results revealed a
negative correlation between Section 363 sales and creditor recoveries.58 In
fact, when controlling for the differences in the prefiling earnings of the two
sets of companies from 2000 to 2004, asset sales yielded less than half as

54

One potential disadvantage of a court-supervised process is that a party in interest could appeal
the ruling confirming the auction winner, and the ultimate transfer of the assets could be delayed years
while the matter meanders through the appellate process. This risk is minimized in bankruptcy. Section
363(m) provides that a sale of assets is unaffected by an appellate court reversing or modifying the auction
ruling as long as the winning bidder was found to have acted in good faith and the sale was not stayed by
the bankruptcy court pending appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m); Alla Raykin, Section 363 Sales: Mooting
Due Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 91, 93–94 (2012).
Naturally, there are exceptions. For example, on December 1, 2021, Limetree Bay Services, LLC—a
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession—designated St. Croix Energy as the auction winner. Shortly thereafter,
Limetree asked the bankruptcy court to reopen the auction. The debtor argued that the CEO of West
Indies Petroleum (WIP) experienced a medical emergency, and WIP was unable to timely submit bid
documents. The court granted the request and held a new auction, which WIP won. See Rick Archer,
Losing Bidder Says Limetree Reopened Sale on False Premise, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2021, 7:32 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1450543/losing-bidder-says-limetree-reopened-sale-on-false-premise
[https://perma.cc/2P58-FXRH]. For another example, see Alex Wolf, ‘The One’ Mansion Can Seek
Higher Offers After $141 Million Bid, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 14, 2022, 1:14 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/the-one-mansion-can-seek-higher-offers-after-141million-bid [https://perma.cc/8RV5-JXLG].
55 See Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 343.
56 See Bhattacharyya & Singh, supra note 40, at 270 (explaining that the auction allows the debtor
to separate the question of how best to maximize asset value from the one of how best to allocate this
value among creditors).
57 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 6–11.
58 Id. at 37.
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much value as reorganizations.59 Scholars promptly attacked these findings,60
but recent research has supported them.61 How can the optimal means to
secure the highest price for most assets produce such woefully deficient
outcomes in bankruptcy?
1. Entry Deterrence and Collusion Risk in Bankruptcy Auctions
Auction efficiency is undermined by many factors that coalesce to
amplify entry deterrence and collusion. As explored in this Section, entry
deterrence occurs when auction dynamics dissuade bidders from incurring
the transaction costs necessary to participate. This phenomenon is troubling
because it often results from some level of party manipulation.
Realized prices at auction tend to increase as more bidders appear.62 The
addition of each new bidder increases the probability of a higher realized
price.63 Consequently, various parties are incentivized to obstruct entry. We
see limited bidders in bankruptcy. This thin market is the result of intentional
and unintentional design choices. Furthermore, repeat-player dynamics in
bankruptcy increase the risk that parties will collude to avoid bidding up
prices. This collusion can involve parties interested in winning an auction at
a certain price or insiders seeking to secure ex post benefits.
a. Auction design
Auction design cannot be “one size fits all.”64 Rather, design should
evolve based on context and actors. A distorted auction design can suppress
revenue maximization in ways that are easily overlooked. Bidding format is
59

See id. at 3–4.
See James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REV. 691, 692 (2008) (relying on selection
bias and other errors to discredit LoPucki and Doherty’s findings). See generally Jeremy Murphy,
Bankruptcy Avant-Garde, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 113, 123–24 (2011) (relying on an options
pricing model to argue that the difference in recoveries identified by LoPucki and Doherty has
marginal significance).
61 Samuel Antill, Do the Right Firms Survive Bankruptcy?, 144 J. FIN. ECON. 523, 535–36 (2022)
(noting that rushed bankruptcy auctions that occur without creditor approval produce diminished creditor
recoveries compared to comparable reorganizations); Anne M. Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, Acquisitions
in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales and the Existence of Fire Sales, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2014) (finding that Section 363 sales are associated with lower realized prices compared with
sales that occur through a plan of reorganization); see also Julian Franks, Gunjan Seth, Oren Sussman &
Vikrant Vig, Revisiting the Asset Fire Sale Discount: Evidence from Commercial Aircraft Sales (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 722/2021, 2021) (analyzing sales of aircraft by distressed
airlines to acknowledge fire-sale discounting but arguing that inefficiencies associated with fire sales are
likely to be less prevalent than previously documented).
62 See Jeremy Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180–
94 (1996); see also Buccola & Keller, supra note 40, at 119–20 (arguing that allowing interested buyers
with “sufficient financial means to participate in the auction” may maximize sale proceeds); Paul
Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVS. 227, 239 (1999).
63 See Klemperer, supra note 62, at 239.
64 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 31, at 184.
60
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one of the most important facets of auction design. There are four primary
types. The most common design is the ascending-bid or “English” auction.65
In an English auction, the auctioneer announces the seller’s reservation price
and then qualified bidders have the opportunity to overbid this amount,
usually pursuant to preestablished increments. The bidder with the highest
bid price is invariably the winner of the auction.
An English auction is the only format used in bankruptcy, but the reason
for that exclusive use is unclear, and appears to represent a historical
anomaly. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor court rules mandate this format
or even advise on auction design.66 The fact that bankruptcy auctions default
to this format is odd. Economic literature establishes that the English model
will not be optimal in all—or perhaps even most—asset sales.67 For example,
imagine a scenario in which one bidder (Bidder A) values the assets being
sold more than do other bidders. Bidder A’s reservation price68 is $100.
Assume there are five other bidders but none with a reservation price above
$50. Furthermore, assume an ascending-bid auction with incremental
bidding, limited signaling across the bidder group, and bidders behaving
competitively. The five other bidders will presumably stop bidding once the
price crosses the $50 threshold. Bidder A will win the auction with a bid as
low as $51. The seller has lost out on the $49 spread between the realized
price and Bidder A’s reservation price.

65 The descending-bid or “Dutch” auction is a second type. In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer
announces a price generally considered to be above the fair market value of the asset for sale and then
incrementally drops the price until a prequalified bidder agrees to pay the announced price and halt the
auction. Klemperer, supra note 62, at 229. A sealed-bid auction is common in sales conducted by
government entities. See id. at 266 n.14. In a sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits its highest and best
offer in a sealed envelope. All envelopes are opened concurrently and the bidder with the highest bid is
the winner of the auction. Id. at 229. Finally, Professor Vickrey pioneered the second-price auction, which
is identical to the sealed-bid auction except that the amount paid by the highest bidder is not the amount
listed in the highest bid, but the amount listed in the second-highest bid. Id.
66 For example, Delaware bankruptcy courts are considered the most prominent bankruptcy courts
in the country. See Jeffrey P. Fuller, Analysis: Three Bankruptcy Courts Remain Top Megacase Magnets,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 17, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-three-bankruptcy-courts-remain-top-megacase-magnets
[https://perma.cc/4SY33FL4]. Delaware’s local bankruptcy rules afford the debtor discretion to establish the bidding format that
it believes will maximize revenue. See BANKR. D. DEL. R. 6004-1(c). The rules allow for an ascendingbid auction, but that format is not mandated. The local rules for New York bankruptcy courts do not
mention auction design.
67 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 31, at 184.
68 The bidder’s reservation price—or reserve price—is the highest price the bidder is willing to pay
for the assets. The seller’s reservation price is the lowest price the seller will accept for the assets. See Ian
Steedman, Reservation Price and Reservation Demand, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 11586, 11586 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018).
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The harm goes further. We know that a potential bidder is deterred from
bidding when she believes her chances of winning are low.69 In a traditional
ascending-bid auction, bidders understand that the process provides an
advantage to a resource-rich bidder with a relatively high reservation price.
Consequently, the resource-poor bidder may choose to avoid the transaction
costs inherent in participating in what may seem like a doomed endeavor.70
Fewer bidders raise the probability that the auction’s realized price may be
lower than $51.71
Further complicating matters, the public nature of the bankruptcy
process allows bidders to engage in predation, a tactic where Bidder A sends
signals to other potential bidders that they should not incur the transaction
costs necessary to enter the auction because Bidder A is prepared to overpay
for the assets or enjoys some sort of informational advantage.72 This problem
is amplified because bankruptcy auctions rely heavily on a stalking-horse
bidder, a party that has presumably evaluated the assets and agreed to
purchase those assets at a price that will ultimately be the initial bid in the
upcoming auction. Stalking-horse bidders are rare in most auctions outside

69

See Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 368.
Significant transaction costs plague the bid-preparation process. See Matthew Kapitanyan & Ryan
J. Dattilo, A Sotheby’s 363 Sale: Lessons Learned from the Auction Experts, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 1, 3 (2016) (first citing Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover
Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 30 (1991); and then citing Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 364).
Assembling a team of professionals to properly assess the assets and then formulate a bidding strategy
is costly.
71 Cf. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 62, at 185–86 (“[A]n auction with N + 1 bidders and no reserve
price is more profitable than any standard mechanism with N bidders.”). One simple solution is for debtors
to consider an alternative format. The debtor could pursue a descending-bid auction in which the court
would set a price for the auction to begin, and the first bidder to accept a stated price would be the winner.
I acknowledge that descending-bid auctions are extremely foreign in bankruptcy, so a hybrid model may
be ideal. Ultimately, the “Anglo-Dutch” hybrid combines an ascending-bid process with a sealed-bid
auction, see Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 384–85, and is common in many government auctions. A
typical “Anglo-Dutch” auction starts as an ascending-bid auction and is run until only two bidders remain.
The two remaining bidders are then required to make a final sealed-bid offer that is not lower than the
current price. The auction’s winner is the one who submits the highest sealed bid. Assume we have Bidder
A, with a reservation price of $100; and Bidder B, with a reservation price of $75. Further assume that
these two bidders are the only ones who remain after a few rounds in the initial ascending-bid auction. At
that point, both remaining bidders are invited to submit a sealed bid. Bidder A has a much higher
reservation price but can no longer play along until Bidder B hits its reservation price. Bidder A will need
to make a final bid without complete information regarding Bidder B’s reservation price. Assuming
Bidder B has not signaled its relatively weaker position, there is a strong possibility that Bidder A will
approach its reservation price, allowing the estate to capture the spread between Bidder B’s reservation
price and the realized price, which should approximate Bidder A’s reservation price. Note that this hybrid
model adds a level of unpredictability to the proceedings and may encourage robust bidder entry. Afterall,
Bidder A may underbid in its final sealed bid.
72 See Klemperer, supra note 31, at 174.
70
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of bankruptcy but are an absolute fixture inside of bankruptcy.73 Stalkinghorse bidders can help draw other bidders—especially those interested in
free riding on the diligence performed by a seemingly competent
competitor—to an auction. However, economic literature has demonstrated
that a diminished realized price is often an overlooked risk of an auction in
which one bidder has an initial stake.74
One form of predation in bankruptcy is the signal that the stalking-horse
bidder has had additional time to perform due diligence and, in light of the
extremely truncated timelines provided to other bidders, will enjoy an
informational advantage. A corollary to this premise is that the stalkinghorse bidder—because of this informational advantage—is better situated to
assess asset value and avoid unnecessary discounting in formulating its
reservation price.75 The ultimate result is the likelihood that the stalkinghorse bidder will have a far higher reservation price than other bidders. The
sales procedures also afford the stalking-horse bidder other perks, including
a breakup fee worth between 1% and 3% of the ultimate realized price in the
event the stalking-horse bidder does not win the auction.76
In bankruptcy, the mix of poor design, predation, and information
asymmetries all work to chill bidding.77 A strong signal dissuades bidders

73 In fact, a stalking-horse bidder is seen as an essential part of the auction, and an auction without
one at the outset will be predicted to fail. See White, supra note 60, at 708.
74 See, e.g., Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Auctions in Bankruptcy 3–5 (July 1999)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=161990 [https://perma.cc/VRC7-ES3S] (discussing
how the potential of overbidding by bidders with an initial stake can deter other bidders from entering the
contest, resulting in an uncompetitive auction).
75 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1246 (2006).
76 A secured creditor who is credit bidding is another party that deters entry in many cases. A secured
creditor is entitled in bankruptcy to credit bid the face value of its debt at the auction of the asset on which
it has a senior lien. Assume that the debtor owes its secured creditor $10,000, and the creditor has a
properly perfected lien on the debtor’s sole asset, which is to be sold in bankruptcy. The creditor has a
right to credit bid the $10,000 it is owed; in other words, it doesn’t need to provide any cash to win the
auction as long as the price does not exceed $10,000. A bidder who intends to bid less than $10,000
knows that the secured creditor can easily outbid it. A secured creditor is also extremely familiar with the
auctioned assets, which may provide it an informational advantage that could similarly deter bidder entry.
See Buccola & Keller, supra note 40, at 120; see also In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR,
2009 WL 3242292, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009) (recognizing the debtor’s argument that the court
should preclude credit bidding because it was likely to chill competitive bidding).
77 In some cases, individuals serving in key executive or board roles with the debtor work with thirdparty bidders seeking to purchase the auctioned assets. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in
Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 635 (1993). This dynamic exacerbates the fear of information
asymmetries and also chills bidding.
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from incurring the transaction costs necessary to be a legitimate threat,
creating anomalistic yields in many cases.78
b.

Bidder collusion, intermediary conflict, and the threat of
punishing rivals
Debtors-in-possession (DIP), stalking-horse bidders, and legal and
financial professionals, as well as other interested parties, frequently
dissuade potential bidders from participating in auctions. We see this
problem both inside and outside of bankruptcy. In a recent article, Professors
Guhan Subramanian and Annie Zhao explain how conflicts of interest and
similar dynamics cause investment bankers and other professional
intermediaries to favor certain buyers at the expense of revenue
maximization.79 The problem is more pronounced in bankruptcy because of
the insular community of professionals that dictate outcomes in these cases.
The recent Neiman Marcus bankruptcy offers an example. Daniel
Kamensky was the founder of distressed-debt hedge fund Marble Ridge
Capital and served on the creditors’ committee in the Neiman Marcus case.
As a committee member, Kamensky acted as a fiduciary to the creditors the
committee represented. As part of a settlement between the creditors’
committee and the bankruptcy estate, 140 million Series B shares of Neiman
Marcus’s subsidiary, MyTheresa, were allocated to the creditors’
committee.80 In an effort to liquidate the shares, the committee solicited bids.
Marble Ridge submitted a proposal to buy up to 60 million shares at twenty
cents on the dollar. Jefferies, a prominent investment bank of which Marble
Ridge was a client, contacted the committee’s financial advisor and indicated
that it would be submitting a bid that was substantially higher than twenty
cents on the dollar. Upon learning of this new competitor, Kamensky sent
Joe Femenia, the head of distressed-debt trading at Jefferies, a text message:
“Do Not Send in a Bid.”81 In a subsequent call with individuals from
Jefferies, Kamensky demanded that Jefferies not submit a competing bid.
Marble Ridge was a valuable Jefferies client, and Kamensky indicated that
he could pull his hedge fund’s business if the bank moved forward. Jefferies
ultimately withdrew its bid but informed counsel for the creditors’ committee
of Kamensky’s role in engineering that result. Kamensky was arrested on
78 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, apps. A-1, A-2 (collecting cases comparing outcomes in
asset sales and reorganizations).
79 See Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1215,
1253–54 (2020).
80 See Amanda Cantrell, In Five Hours, Daniel Kamensky Destroyed His Career. Why?,
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1nds3878fmgb7/InFive-Hours-Daniel-Kamensky-Destroyed-His-Career-Why [https://perma.cc/67RL-QC4K].
81 See id.
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September 3, 2020, and charged with fraud, extortion, and obstruction of
justice.82 He pled guilty and was sentenced to six months in prison.83
Kamensky’s conduct was illegal regardless of his role in the case but was
particularly egregious because he was a creditor representative tasked with
pursuing the highest value for the MyTheresa shares.
Though this event occurred outside the typical auction process, it is
representative of bidder dynamics in many bankruptcy cases.84 Bankruptcy’s
repeat-player model discourages institutions and professionals with deep
financial connections from behaving competitively in relatively small-stakes
auctions that could sour multimillion-dollar relationships.85
Another form of collusion is fueled by bankruptcy’s unique principal–
agent problem. Corporate bankruptcy cases are managed by the debtor’s
executives. Most of these individuals do not have guaranteed employment
prospects once the bankruptcy case closes. Consequently, these insiders—
who are tasked with making key resolution decisions—are subject to
governance mismatch86 and prone to self-interested conduct that may be
detrimental to all stakeholders. More specifically, there are numerous cases

82

Id.
See Soma Biswas, Hedge-Fund Founder Kamensky Gets Prison Sentence for Fraud Tied to
Neiman Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/neiman-marcus-foekamensky-sentenced-to-six-months-in-prison-for-bankruptcy-fraud-11620405322
[https://perma.cc/2L7R-2C3D].
84 Another example is the Caesars bankruptcy case. Executives at Apollo, the equity sponsor of the
debtors, made calls to pressure key executives at Oaktree, a creditor in the case who was standing in the
way of a settlement Apollo sought. See MAX FRUMES & SUJEET INDAP, THE CAESARS PALACE COUP:
HOW A BILLIONAIRE BRAWL OVER THE FAMOUS CASINO EXPOSED THE POWER AND GREED OF WALL
STREET 122 (2021). “Apollo had . . . a gift for preying on the pain points of its adversaries. Apollo
ominously reminded them that Oaktree and [other key creditors] depended on deal flow from Apollo that
they could be excluded from in the future.” Id.
Further examples abound. See Alex Wolf, Jay Alix’s RICO Suit Against McKinsey Revived on Appeal
(1), BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 19, 2022, 1:28 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/jay-alixsracketeering-suit-against-mckinsey-revived-on-appeal [https://perma.cc/D7DP-FNZS] (explaining
allegations that McKinsey & Co., the restructuring advisory firm, concealed blatant conflicts of interest
in thirteen large corporate bankruptcies in order to secure lucrative bankruptcy work); see also Jared A.
Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745, 752–57 (2020) (detailing how
relationship dynamics distort decision-making for financially distressed entities); Rotem & Dekel, supra
note 36, at 347 (explaining how the prospect of future business and existing relationships could entice
professionals to contravene ethical and professional obligations in facilitating sales to particular bidders).
85 See supra note 75.
86 See Samir D. Parikh, Bankruptcy Tourism and the European Union’s Corporate Restructuring
Quandary: The Cathedral in Another Light, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 205, 265 (2020) (“Directors, senior
officers, and other insiders – who are invariably shareholders as well and receive variable compensation
based on company performance – share in the prosperity of the company for which they work. During
times of corporate profitability, these insiders . . . suppress self-interested conduct to the extent that it
creates a material risk of harm to their employer. However, once a subject company becomes insolvent,
it is often disadvantageous for insiders to suppress their self-interested conduct.”).
83
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of key decision-makers seemingly ignoring revenue maximization in order
to facilitate a sale to a “white knight” buyer willing to offer ex post
employment and other opportunities.87 We can return to the Neiman Marcus
bankruptcy for another example. A key creditor in that case alleged that the
debtor’s management team had signed a restructuring support agreement
with influential creditors and ultimately eschewed a seemingly valuemaximizing merger with Saks Fifth Avenue because the alternative did not
provide these insiders with guaranteed postsale employment.88
2. Bullying Creditors and Court Heuristics
A significant part of bankruptcy architecture is the idea of a debtor’s
prebankruptcy management team running the company in bankruptcy for the
benefit of creditors. As noted above, self-interested conduct is an everpresent fear. The principal–agent problem in bankruptcy has another facet:
management may be too influenced by the demands of some creditors and
willing to ignore others. Indeed, the debtor-in-possession is invariably reliant
on at least one prominent creditor who has agreed to fund the bankruptcy
case. Furthermore, there are groups of key creditors without whom the debtor
has little chance of constructing a successful exit.89 These parties are able to
influence management in unforeseen ways.
The result is that these and other bullying creditors render debtors
tolerant of sales that are inefficient.90 Even in cases where it is likely that a
deferred sale will provide more value than a rushed sale, key creditors will
push for a rushed sale.91 Hoping to capture the speed premium, bankruptcy
auctions are frequently accelerated and continue despite concerns about
realized price. Regardless of periods of economic downturns, illiquidity in
the credit markets, or industry-specific distress, disposition may be pursued
because of the fear that further erosion in asset value awaits the patient
debtor. As noted above, the simple premise is that there is a speed premium
87 See In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, 651 F.3d 642, 651 n.6 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is an
inherent risk of self-dealing on the part of existing management [overseeing auctions]. We have
recognized that existing management may have an incentive to favor ‘white knight’ bidders favorably
disposed to preserving the existing business over others who might enter higher bids.”); Rose, supra note
52, at 278 (“Management rewards played a significant role in Polaroid’s bankruptcy § 363 preplan
business sale.”); see also Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale, 39 YALE J. ON
REGUL. 1, 4–5 (2022); Antill, supra note 61, at 525 n.9; Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison,
Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 538–39 (2009) (questioning the
motivations of managers and equity holders as they relate to the interests of other parties to a bankruptcy).
88 See Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 87, at 4–5, 5 n.11.
89 See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 87, at 512; cf. Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 87, at 3–4
(explaining how DIP loan contracts may sometimes constitute a “significant transfer of control” to
creditors in the bankruptcy process).
90 Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 346–47.
91 See Neyland & St. John, supra note 40, at 56.
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created by expeditiously selling off a distressed company, and senior
creditors—the parties invariably pushing for the asset sale—will be allocated
that premium.
In a new paper, Professors Jordan Neyland and Kathryn St. John use a
call-option analogy to demonstrate that creditors exhibit a strong preference
to pursue early sales, even with significant risks of diminished yield and
“when such assets are not depreciating or otherwise declining in value.”92
These creditors invariably believe they have little to gain from postponing
auctions in an attempt to find a more favorable bidding environment.93 And
these bullying creditors, including secured lenders and DIP loan financiers,
have enough leverage in these cases to dictate outcomes.94 Indeed, they are
willing to fund the case to an accelerated auction but not beyond that point.
But the harm from failed auctions affects parties well below the bullying
creditors’ tier.
Court heuristics complicate these dynamics. Jurists incorrectly assume
that bankruptcy auctions allow assets to be exposed to an efficient market
and the winning bid in such a process must represent an approximation of
fair market value, at the very least.95 But auction processes with material
design flaws rarely yield fair market value, and rushed sales may cause the
estate to miss a value rebound. Further, as highlighted by Professors LoPucki
and Doherty, a party capable of supplying the capital needed to purchase a
large corporation out of bankruptcy in a rushed sale will “demand a
substantial return on investment.”96 In other words, this buyer would demand
fire-sale prices.
92

See id. at 81.
See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 761 (2011); cf. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?,
47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 173–74 (2005) (stating that controlling senior creditors sometimes influence debtors
to undervalue assets in order to enhance their recovery, often to the detriment of unsecured creditors).
94 See Casey, supra note 93; In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that when
pushed by a bullying creditor, “the natural tendency of a debtor in distress . . . is to pacify [that creditor]
with whom the debtor would expect to do business” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796)); see also Ayotte & Morrison,
supra note 87, at 514–15; David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance
in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 919 (2003); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party
in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2003); Baird & Rasmussen, Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at
684–85.
95 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 13 (explaining that many bankruptcy judges put so much
faith in the auction process that they will not consider data that indicates that the sale price is woefully
inadequate); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 73 (2005) (critiquing judges who assumed that agreements of
parties reflect the market at work); Transcript of Applications for Employment; Cash Collateral Motion,
and the Bid Procedures Motion; Request to Be Added to the Committee at 40, In re Remington Outdoor
Co., No. 20-81688 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2020).
96 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 9.
93
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Bankruptcy auctions are plagued by deficiencies. Revenue
maximization is elusive, creating a diminished-yield universe. Even within
this universe, outliers exist.
3. Volatile Assets
Auctions represent market assessments, but bankruptcy sales are
infected with myriad deficiencies that can distort the process. Asset sales
involving volatile assets are particularly troubling because of the possibility
of extremely diminished yields. The term “volatile assets” describes assets
subject to wild fluctuations because of exogenous market conditions—
including economic shocks stemming from the Great Recession or the
COVID-19 pandemic—that invariably affect a number of entities in an
industry or multiple related industries.97 Economic shocks could distort an
auction in varied ways, including creating entry deterrence due to illiquidity
in capital markets.
The fire sales in the Lehman Brothers and Chrysler bankruptcy cases
occurred during the Great Recession and are just two examples of an
exogenous market factor creating an auction with only one bidder98 and
paltry proceeds.99 The General Motors asset sale occurred during the same
period and attracted no bidders; the company was ostensibly sold to itself
with funding from the U.S. government.100
Sales involving volatile assets have heightened risks of depressed
yields, especially in times when there are market corrections and certain
industries are destabilized. In these settings, sellers have brought wares to an
empty marketplace. Companies that continue on with an asset sale believing

97

See Neyland & St. John, supra note 40, at 29.
See David Teather, Andrew Clark & Jill Treanor, Barclays Agrees $1.75bn
Deal for Core Lehman Brothers Business, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2008, 9:50 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/sep/17/barclay.lehmanbrothers1 [https://perma.cc/7FGEPQHV]; Michael J. de la Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Deal with Chrysler Seals Swift
42-Day Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/
global/11chrysler.html [https://perma.cc/GC6Z-5JJ4].
99 The Lehman Brothers fire sale caused the company “to lose at least $50 billion in portfolio value.”
Mark J. Roe & Stephen D. Adams, Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Selling
Lehman’s Derivatives Portfolio, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 363, 386–88 (2015) (explaining why Lehman’s fire
sale caused it to lose so much value); see also Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate
Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions? 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 451–
53 (2009) (discussing how the Bankruptcy Code is incapable of preventing major losses when major
market players like Lehman Brothers become insolvent); Emily Chasan, Lehman Says Barclays
Got $13 Billion Windfall in Sale, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uslehman-barclays/lehman-says-barclays-got-13-billion-windfall-in-sale-idUSTRE62H5K920100318
[https://perma.cc/PK3X-27J9].
100 See Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 531, 537–38 (2009).
98
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it to be the most viable means of preserving value invariably encounter
terrible results.101
In the following Part, I argue that another unique class of assets exists
alongside volatile assets. The assets in this class belong to debtors I refer to
as “scarlet-lettered companies.” These companies own assets tainted by
endogenous factors and face profound threats to revenue maximization that
exist independent of customary market variables. This depressed-yield
subset presents a heightened risk of staggering inefficiency. And these new
cases are particularly troubling because diminished yields affect atypical
creditors. I argue that asset sales involving scarlet-lettered companies would
create massive speed discounts that are borne not by sophisticated creditors
who enjoy various safety nets, but by mass tort victims—a group illequipped to bear this burden and one that lacks the ability to hedge these
risks ex ante.
II. SCARLET-LETTERED COMPANIES AND RESIDUAL STAIN THEORY
Part I detailed the popularity of bankruptcy asset sales as a vehicle to
compensate creditors. But these auctions are infected with myriad
deficiencies that can distort the process and suppress proceeds. In this Part,
I argue that there is a unique alternative for some mass tort defendants.
Auctions are intended to efficiently allocate assets among a group of
bidders.102 Therefore, auction design and use must start by understanding
participant demands. A seller’s comprehensive disclosure of ownership risks
will increase the likelihood of maximized revenue in every auction type.103
Unfortunately, a seller may be unable to properly assess the future risk
associated with ownership of certain assets. And for a unique subset of
entities—which I refer to as scarlet-lettered companies—this uncertainty can
fuel pricing chaos.
Bankruptcy allows us to undertake an unprecedented analysis of scarletlettered companies through an auction-theory lens. We are at the forefront of
an emerging trend in aggregate litigation. There are only a few cases so far—
most notably Purdue Pharma and the bankruptcy of Johnson & Johnson’s

101 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, apps. A-1, A-2 (listing numerous examples, including
Network Plus Corporation’s going-concern sale that yielded approximately 4% of book value).
102 MILGROM, supra note 31, at 6.
103 See Rotem & Dekel, supra note 36, at 370–71 (citing Milgrom & Weber, supra note 33, at 1096)
(explaining that a bidder, if unable to calculate the cost associated with risk of ownership, is likely to
reduce her valuation of the asset by an amount at least equal to the expected loss arising from such risk;
for this reason, disclosure of risks should not diminish auction proceeds, all else being equal).
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talc subsidiary104—but more await, including pharmacies in the drug supply
chain that helped fuel the opioid crisis,105 cell phone manufacturers that may
obscure the risks of extended use of wireless products,106 and food producers
104 In October 2021, Johnson & Johnson executed a “divisive merger”—an extremely obscure
maneuver that allowed for the isolation of all liability related to its talcum-powder business in a new
limited-liability company called LTL Management LLC, while a host of valuable assets were transferred
to another subsidiary. David Warfield, Johnson & Johnson: The Texas Two-Step and Talc-Related
Liabilities, JDSUPRA (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/johnson-johnson-the-texastwo-step-and-9551060/ [https://perma.cc/46DN-YTG3]. A number of valuable assets were transferred to
another subsidiary. On October 14, 2021, LTL Management filed for bankruptcy while the other parts of
the Johnson & Johnson empire stayed out of the process. Id.; see Rick Archer,
Johnson & Johnson Puts Talc Spinoff into Ch. 11, LAW360 (Oct. 14. 2021, 6:29 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1431315/johnson-johnson-puts-talc-spinoff-into-ch-11
[https://perma.cc/
ZRE2-G2N3]; see also Jonathan Randles, Becky Yerak & Andrew Scurria, How Bankruptcy Could
Help Johnson & Johnson Corral Vast Talc Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-bankruptcy-could-help-johnson-johnson-corral-vast-talclitigation-11626773400 [https://perma.cc/DTK5-N6T3] (explaining that “[d]ividing assets from
liabilities is possible under a Texas corporate law through what are known as divisive mergers or
divisional mergers.”). The bankruptcy case is currently pending before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey. See Vince Sullivan, J&J Talc Liability Unit’s Ch. 11 Transferred to NJ, LAW360
(Nov. 10, 2021, 3:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/bankruptcy/articles/1439777/j-j-talc-liability-units-ch-11-transferred-to-nj [https://perma.cc/3TEQ-SKD5]. Divisive mergers can be attacked as fraudulent
transfers. If the bankruptcy court determines that Johnson & Johnson’s elaborate maneuver was a
fraudulent transfer, the valuable assets that were separated from talc liabilities may be clawed back into
the bankruptcy estate. Warfield, supra. In the case that the valuable assets are brought back into the
bankruptcy estate, the public benefit proposal could help guide the disposition of these assets. Indeed,
Johnson & Johnson’s talcum powder business “is still extremely profitable and does not
face extensive legal challenges overseas that it does domestically.” Samir D. Parikh, Mass Exploitation,
170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 72 (2022); Jasper Jolly, Johnson & Johnson Faces Push to
Force Global Ban on Talc Baby Powder Sales, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2022, 8:50 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/feb/06/johnson-johnson-faces-push-to-force-global-banon-talc-baby-powder-sales [https://perma.cc/7C2H-R4NV].
105 See Ian Lopez, Opioid Verdict Puts Health Systems Next in Line for Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG L.
(Dec. 15, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/opioid-verdict-puts-healthsystems-next-in-line-for-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/37WE-WLQF] (explaining how Walmart Inc., CVS
Health Corp., Walgreens, and others in the drug supply chain are now facing blame for fueling the opioid
crisis).
106 Some studies have established an increased risk—albeit nominal—of cancerous brain tumors in
individuals who engaged in consistent cell phone use in proximity to their skull. The risk fluctuated with
the number of years of use and increased after ten years of usage. See Seung-Kwon Myung et al., Mobile
Phone Use and Risk of Tumors: A Meta-Analysis, 27 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5565, 5571 (2009); L.
Lloyd Morgan, Anthony B. Miller, Annie Sasco & Devra Lee Davis, Mobile Phone Radiation Causes
Brain Tumors and Should Be Classified as a Probable Human Carcinogen, 46 INT’L J. ONCOLOGY 1865,
1869 (2015) (finding that mobile phones can cause cancer, and that the risk of cancer is higher in people
who began using cell phones as children). The latency period was believed to be no less than ten years.
Id. Of course, the idea that cell phone use could present a material health risk to the general public is
anathema. But this was also true with asbestos at the turn of the twentieth century. See generally P.W.J.
Bartrip, History of Asbestos Related Disease, 80 POSTGRAD MED. J. 72 (2004) (outlining the importance
of asbestos to industry in the early twentieth century and the slow realization of the dangers of asbestos).
The health consequences would eclipse those posed by any other personal-injury mass tort because cell
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that recklessly distributed tainted infant formula.107 For now, much of the
formulation is theoretical, requiring an extrapolation from what we already
know.
A. Understanding Scarlet-Lettered Companies
The United States is experiencing a renewed emphasis on
accountability. Individual and corporate malfeasance are being addressed
differently than in previous generations. I believe this new environment will
accelerate the rise of scarlet-lettered companies. A scarlet-lettered company
is one responsible for gross criminality and corporate misconduct that
produces harm on a large scale and, once revealed, earns the company
searing public scorn and diminished asset values.
Scarlet-lettered companies can highlight historical failures. Almost all
of the ones we have seen so far involve criminality or significant malfeasance
committed years or decades ago that was overlooked at the time. Previous
generations’ inertia and apathy are often the reasons why such gross
transgressions were allowed to continue unabated. Holding scarlet-lettered
companies responsible today is the manifestation of a societal shift.
Social science and business literature have explored this shift and
attributed it to a generational value swing, coupled with social media’s
ability to connect and mobilize historically silenced groups.108 Researchers
phone manufacturers would face potential liability from the cell phones they sold as well as other
peripherals, including wireless headphones. See SWISS RE INST., SWISS RE SONAR: NEW
EMERGING RISK INSIGHTS 29 (2019), https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:5916802c-cf6b-4c67-9d4239cf80c4b00d/SONAR%20Publication%202019_WEB_quality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EFH-R6D4]
(noting that some studies find significant health concerns regarding electromagnetic radiation from cell
phones and related wireless sources); Joel M. Moskowitz & Larry Junck, Should Cellphones Have
Warning Labels?, MARKETWATCH (June 11, 2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shouldcellphones-have-warning-labels-2016-06-11 [https://perma.cc/DS32-RPZM]; LLOYD’S, LLOYD’S
EMERGING RISKS TEAM REPORT: ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELDS FROM MOBILE PHONES: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 14 (2010), https://assets.lloyds.com/assets/pdf-emf-final-november-2010/1/pdf-emffinal-november-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U57-DXUQ] (warning that scientific and legal
developments could change the insurance climate and comparing the potential risk to what occurred with
asbestos).
107 See Susan Berfield & Anna Edney, Inside the Infant Formula Disaster, BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2022, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-0825/baby-formula-shortage-a-deadly-bacteria-and-abbott-s-abt-missteps [https://perma.cc/VD8E-7XTK].
108
For example, Boy Scouts of America (BSA) held records detailing unaddressed abuse by
volunteers from as early as 1919. Arthur W. Humphries, Inside the ‘Perversion Files,’ L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), https://documents.latimes.com/boy-scouts-paper-trail-of-abuse-documents/
[https://perma.cc/75UR-RS7Z]. BSA took no meaningful action against abusers through multiple
generations, even though allegations were well-known. Over 100 Years of Hidden Abuse, ABUSED IN
SCOUTING, https://abusedinscouting.com/history-of-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/E6PB-X37F]. Throughout
the twentieth century, when faced with a survivor suit based on sexual abuse, BSA invoked statutes of
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have been attempting to conceptualize this phenomenon and its larger
impacts. The findings reveal that younger generations have a stronger social
conscience109 and lack faith in the ability of traditional institutions to prevent
or police criminal behavior;110 many have realized that monitors have
brazenly obfuscated their oversight lapses.111 This enlightenment has fueled
movements that rely on online social networks to galvanize supporters and
demand corrective measures. Furthermore, the willingness of victims to
share their stories publicly has forced wrongdoers to confront critical masses
of individuals exhibiting levels of harm that cannot be dismissed. The
resulting phenomenon has already subjected numerous individuals and
limitation to avoid liability. New Lawsuit Could Allow Boy Scouts to File Sex Abuse Claims Even if the
Statute of Limitations Has Expired in Their States, CBS NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bsa-lawsuit-boy-scouts-of-america-faces-new-lawsuit-that-couldallow-more-scouts-to-file-claims-today-2020-01-06/ [https://perma.cc/LUZ6-K88X]. But in the 2000s,
public outcry pushed the moment to crisis. Over 100 Years of Hidden Abuse, supra. State legislatures
passed laws extending the statutes of limitations in these cases to allow suits to proceed. Id. Survivor suits
ultimately forced BSA to release its records, which documented the abuse in excruciating detail. Id. This
action forced BSA to file for bankruptcy. Id.
The same dynamic emerged with USA Gymnastics and Larry Nassar. Sexual and physical abuse had
been a staple of organized women’s gymnastics for decades, without comment. Anna North, Gymnastics
Still Hasn’t Fully Reckoned with Its Abuse Problem, VOX (July 24, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/22585637/gymnastics-tokyo-olympics-2021-abuse-larry-nassar [https://perma.cc/
Q4GG-WJH4] (stating that USA Gymnastics has a history of “mishandling or dismissing reports of
abuse” and that “many gymnasts have also said that the culture of gymnastics perpetuate[s] physical and
emotional abuse”). But something shifted in 2016: female athletes organized and demanded
accountability, ultimately forcing that organization to disclose secret dossiers on over fifty coaches and
doctors who had been accused of sexual abuse but had never been reported. Marisa Kwiatkowski, Larry
Nassar’s Abuse of Gymnasts, Including Simone Biles Went Back Decades. Why It Still Matters in
Tokyo., USA TODAY (July 27, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2021/07/27/usagymnastics-larry-nasser-abuse-scandal-looms-over-tokyo-olympics/5375279001/
[https://perma.cc/US42-UCFY].
109 See DELOITTE, supra note 19, at 28–32.
110 See, e.g., Elena Chatzopoulou & Adrian de Kiewiet, Millennials’ Evaluation of Corporate Social
Responsibility: The Wants and Needs of the Largest and Most Ethical Generation, 20 J. CONSUMER
BEHAV. 521, 530–31 (2021) (discussing findings of “broad cynicism” of corporate ethicality in
Millennials); Aryn Baker, Global Youth in Revolt, TIME, Feb. 3, 2020, at 48, 49 (describing various
global youth-led movements that share “a desire to tear down and rebuild structures built by past
generations”); Linda S. Greene et al., Talking About Black Lives Matter and #MeToo, 34 WIS. J. L.
GENDER & SOC’Y 109, 119–21 (2019) (proposing that a key commonality between the Black Lives Matter
and #MeToo movements is “a rejection of institutions and traditional hierarchies”); Melissa Lane, The
Moral Dimension of Corporate Accountability, in GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON
HUMAN RIGHTS? 229, 229–31 (Andrew Kuper ed., 2005) (discussing whether corporations can and
should take moral responsibility in response to increasing calls for greater corporate accountability from
activists and academics); see also Marshall Ganz, Leading Change: Leadership, Organization, and Social
Movements, in HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE: A HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
CENTENNIAL COLLOQUIUM 527, 530 (2010) (noting that the function of social movements is to change
the rules and that “social movement leadership is often drawn from among the young”).
111 See DELOITTE, supra note 19, at 28–32; see also Greene et al., supra note 110, at 111–12, 119–
21 (discussing how social media helped give traction to the BLM and #MeToo movements).
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entities to public scrutiny in unprecedented ways. The ensnared include
individuals like Bill Cosby, Harvey Weinstein, and Jeffrey Epstein;112
corporate behemoths like 3M, Johnson & Johnson, and Purdue Pharma; and
nonprofit organizations like USA Gymnastics, Boy Scouts of America, and
countless archdioceses.113
Criminal prosecution offers closure for some victims and the promise
of precluding future criminality, but victims invariably require financial
compensation in order to reassemble fractured pieces. And the most daunting
resolution complexities exist in this civil-recovery sphere.
Scarlet-lettered companies are a new species in the mass tort universe,
and they will require unique avenues to resolution. Current examples have
sought settlement through federal bankruptcy, eschewing traditional
litigation forums, including multidistrict litigation.114 I argue that this
maneuver will persist for these defendants because scarlet-lettered
companies are not contesting liability.115 Bankruptcy offers comprehensive
claim aggregation, accelerated resolution, and valuable optionality, all of
which are particularly attractive to mass tort defendants.116 But the
bankruptcy process is characterized by forum shopping117 and statutory
loopholes118 that allow mass-restructuring debtors to impose a new bargain
on victims. These dynamics can create inequitable outcomes and heighten
the risk that victims’ trusts will be prematurely insolvent. Early trust failure
invariably means that victims’ claims will be unsatisfied.
112 See Amanda Kerri, Why Did It Take So Long to Take Down Epstein, Cosby, and Spacey?,
ADVOCATE (July 12, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2019/7/12/why-did-ittake-so-long-take-down-epstein-cosby-and-spacey [https://perma.cc/7GEF-HWJA].
113 I acknowledge that plaintiffs’ attorneys also play a role in advancing movements. See, e.g., Sara
Randazzo & Jacob Bunge, Inside the Mass-Tort Machine that Powers Thousands of Roundup Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-mass-tort-machine-that-powersthousands-of-roundup-lawsuits-11574700480 [https://perma.cc/62KW-V2LQ] (describing how there has
been a surge in mass tort litigation because of “a little-known sophisticated legal ecosystem that includes
marketing firms that find potential clients, financiers who bankroll law firms, doctors who review medical
records, scientists who analyze medical literature and the lawyers who bring the cases to court”).
114 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 28; see generally Parikh, supra note 104, at 53 (arguing that “mass
tort defendants” like “Johnson & Johnson, Purdue Pharma, USA Gymnastics, and Boy Scouts of
America” use bankruptcy strategically for settlement).
115 Parikh, supra note 18, at 20 (explaining that the scale of the harm and the number of claims is
great and necessitates settlement regardless of the merits of each individual claim).
116 Id. (explaining the attractiveness of the bankruptcy process).
117 See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 40–41 (describing how court competition has
incentivized forum shopping); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11’s Descent into Lawlessness,
96 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9–10), https://www.lopucki.com/pdf/
LoPucki%20Chapter%2011's%20Descent%20into%20Lawlessness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TXXMM2E]; Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 CONN. L. REV. 159, 173–81
(2013).
118 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 6; Parikh, supra note 104, at 60–64.
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The same issues that plague companies selling volatile assets affect
scarlet-lettered companies, but the potential harm is amplified. Resolution
complexity is especially pernicious because the scale is vast—requiring
significant resources to address victims’ claims—but public scorn creates
aggravated value diminution. The very assets necessary to compensate
victims are inexorably tainted by the exposure that brought the scandal
forward in the first place. Also, asset value is further suppressed by the fear
that successor liability will plague any potential buyer in the event that
victims are not properly compensated through the bankruptcy process.119
Options for preserving value are limited.
The overlooked and misunderstood process unfolds in the stages
outlined below.
1. Public Scorn and Social Norms
Factors that temporarily suppress asset value are prevalent in most
bankruptcy cases. These factors can involve operational deficiencies, spikes
in debt payments, overall market instability, industry-specific distress, or
barriers to capital.120 Naturally, each of these factors can lead to a
company’s demise. With scarlet-lettered companies, the suppression can be
extremely prolonged.
Scarlet-lettered companies involve tainted assets, which I argue are
similar to volatile assets in that both can wildly fluctuate in value. However,
tainted assets are distinct because the fluctuations are not based on
exogenous market conditions affecting various entities and industries; rather,
endogenous factors are at the root. Public outrage over criminal and tortious
conduct committed by an entity’s agents has compromised an
otherwise-viable business and introduced bankruptcy in an attempt to resolve
creditor claims.
Public scorn is a defining characteristic of scarlet-lettered companies.
Purdue is a powerful example. Purdue was not solely responsible for the
opioid crisis, but it was certainly the alpha—developing the fountainhead
drug and depraved distribution strategies that other companies would
119 The General Motors bankruptcy case is the primary example. In that case, individuals harmed
prior to bankruptcy by ignition-switch defects hidden by GM engineers were allowed to assert successor
liability claims against New GM, the winning bidder at the auction of the estate’s key assets. See Elliott
v. General Motors, LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135, 166 (2d Cir. 2016); Vincent S.J.
Buccola & Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL.
766, 783–94 (2021) (advocating for bankruptcy courts to impose successor liability in cases involving
tort claims); see also Brad Warner, Reconciling Bankruptcy Law and Corporate Law Principles:
Imposing Successor Liability on GM and Similar “Sleight-of-Hand” 363 Sales, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEVS.
J. 537, 545–48 (2016).
120 See Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1819, 1827 (2018).
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mimic.121 But Purdue’s depravity does not change the fact that the company
had an extremely profitable business. The company’s core business could
have been auctioned with proceeds used to compensate victims. The fear,
however, was that the sale would have been disastrous,122 and victims would
have been forced to accept heavily discounted recoveries. I believe that this
is the risk for future scarlet-lettered companies as well. The overriding
concern is that bidder discounting will be severe because these cases create
a unique market condition.
As noted above, bankruptcy auctions can be extremely inefficient. This
risk is heightened with scarlet-lettered companies because of the likelihood
that public scorn will create social-norm effects. Economic literature began
exploring social norms in the 1980s. Professor George Akerlof argued that
various conditions exist in which an individual may avoid otherwise
advantageous conduct if she faces a material risk of being sanctioned for
flouting a particular custom or norm.123 Social norms are impactful because
they can override the profit motive in some cases and completely shape
economic behavior and outcomes in others.124 For example, imagine local
landlords in a small town subject to a social norm that urges them to avoid
renting apartments to wealthy, out-of-state tourists during summer months.
Landlords with discriminatory practices arising from these norms receive far
less rental income but may accept this outcome because of community
pressure. In areas of strong community engagement, the norm will actually
override the profit motive.
Social norms can also emanate from a different source. A group of highschool students may agree to no longer work at a restaurant because the
owner is an ardent supporter of a particularly vile political figure. This choice
may cause significant financial loss for many of the students. The restaurant
owner may also suffer if this sentiment affects key customers. Indeed,

121

See Parikh, supra note 18, at 3.
See Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Purdue
Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors apps. A & B, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2021) [hereinafter Purdue Disclosure Statement].
123 See George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One
Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749, 749–50 (1980); see also Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 137, 137–38 (2000); Jon Elster, Social Norms and
Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSPS. 99 (1989) (summarizing key concepts in social norm scholarship);
David Romer, The Theory of Social Custom: A Modification and Some Extensions, 99 Q.J. ECON. 717
(1984) (expanding the theory).
124 See Harrison Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on
Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 15, 15–16 (2009).
122
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businesses customarily experience social-norm effects through customer loss
and diminished revenue.125
“Sin companies” offer an alternative example. A sin company is a
business that sells goods or services that historically have been considered
unethical or morally corrupting, including adult entertainment, gambling,
and tobacco. Economic literature argues that reputational risk exists in this
context—the idea that social norms can negatively affect the market
valuation of publicly traded sin companies because customers and investors
may prefer to limit engagement with such companies.126 This aversion can
affect potential investors and purchasers of goods and services. Many
investors are disinclined to invest in these companies, which increases the
cost of capital.127 Customers may be interested in purchasing the goods or
services being offered but feel pressure to limit their frequency.
Consequently, when valuing sin companies, investment bankers customarily
include an aversion discount.128
Asset valuation in every auction is subject to ex post risk due to
variables that could affect value after the auction is concluded. But auction
theory often assumes that the legal and social risks inherent in purchasing
assets at auction are assessable prior to bidding. And while this is true for
most auctions, others involve assets for which there is no informational sweet
spot.129 In these situations, even the seller does not have the means to properly
assess the risks of ownership. Costs arising from these information gaps are

125 N. Craig Smith & Markus Scholz, Identifying Social Norms Makes for Better Business,
KNOWLEDGE (June 12, 2017), https://knowledge.insead.edu/responsibility/identifying-social-normsmakes-for-better-business-6356 [https://perma.cc/XE7T-44CG] (“By identifying existing norms, or
indeed becoming a norm maker, firms can maintain their legitimacy and manage business profitably while
contributing to societal progress.”).
126 See Hong & Kacperczyk, supra note 124, at 15–16.
127 See id. I acknowledge that this aversion may not materially affect a company’s performance
because (1) customers enjoy the good or service being sold and are unaffected by social norms and
(2) some investors are dissuaded but others—especially those guided solely by profit—are willing to
invest. I make this analogy because, in a scarlet-lettered bankruptcy, key victim groups must assess
whether some extreme discounting exists and, if so, whether the public benefit proposal effectively
addresses value suppression.
128 An analog to sin-company aversion involves “dirty” companies that engage in activities that could
be characterized as fundamentally destructive to the environment. Examples include oil and gas
companies like Shell Oil. See generally Cara Lombardo & Sarah McFarlane, Third Point Has Big Shell
Stake, Urges Energy Giant to Break Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/thirdpoint-has-big-shell-stake-urges-energy-giant-to-break-up-11635349151
[https://perma.cc/KF9NNKH5].
129 See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 356 (2001) (hypothesizing an informational sweet spot in which all parties and the bankruptcy court
have gathered sufficient information about the debtor to make an informed decision about asset value,
and the costs of waiting for additional information will exceed the benefits of that information).
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unknown and can be determined only at some point well after the
auction concludes.
Expanding on existing literature, I argue that social norms have
particularly severe effects on scarlet-lettered bankruptcies. Companies such
as Purdue face a stain on their brands and businesses that distorts investor
and customer engagement.130 Unfortunately, it is hard to assess the residual
impact of a social-norm stain on future sales and essential business
relationships for a company subject to public scorn. When scarlet-lettered
companies arrive in bankruptcy, a Section 363 sale is often the most viable
course. But uncertainty regarding residual stains will distort scarlet-lettered
auctions.
Auction withdrawal—the idea that bidders will refuse to participate in
auctions due to unascertainable risks—is one consequence of residual stains.
Bidders fear that the scorn that affects the scarlet-lettered company will be
transferred to any buyer of the company. Even bidders who overcome this
initial hurdle131 and enter a scarlet-lettered auction are still plagued by
cautionary bidding. Professors Peter Ésö and Lucy White have developed
the theory of cautionary bidding, which supports a simple premise: when
valuations become noisy from ex post risk that is difficult to assess, bidders
reduce their bids by more than the corresponding increase in the risk
premium.132 This idea may be deemphasized in auctions involving spectrum
licenses, marketable securities, municipal bonds, offshore oil leases, or
timber rights, where legal liabilities and public scorn are rarely apparent. But
value distortion caused by lingering risk is an important variable in auctions
involving a company that has inflicted widespread harm on the general
public. The potential curse is that the winner of the auction is likely to be the
party who has greatly underestimated the impact of the residual stain and
thereby overestimated the asset’s value. I believe that the uncertainty of legal
and business costs associated with the auctioned assets will cause bidders to
reduce their bids to a degree that materially exceeds any actual costs the
winning bidder will bear. Outside of bankruptcy, this type of discounting is
130 See generally Glazek, supra note 3. In Purdue’s case, the stain extended to the Sackler family as
well. Id.
131 Auction models frequently adopt a private-values assumption, meaning that each bidder can make
an accurate internal assessment of an auctioned asset’s value but cannot make an accurate external
assessment; in other words, a bidder can accurately assess what value an asset being auctioned will have
to that particular bidder, but the bidder does not know the value of that asset to other bidders.
See, e.g., Milgrom & Weber, supra note 33, at 1090. However, there are many cases in which a bidder
lacks information necessary to make a meaningful internal assessment of value, which can create
various consequences.
132 In this context, the “risk premium” can be summarized as the additional cost associated with
owning an asset affected by unknown or unforeseen factors that could depress value. See generally Péter
Esö & Lucy White, Precautionary Bidding in Auctions, 72 ECONOMETRICA 77, 78 (2004).

455

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

terrible for the seller. Inside of bankruptcy, this type of discounting is terrible
for mass tort victims who are dependent on auction proceeds.
Residual stains and the rush to sell assets will produce staggeringly
diminished yields in scarlet-lettered auctions.133 As noted above, a significant
portion of bankruptcy-auction literature overlooks cautionary bidding and
instead touts the idea of a speed premium. This perspective has helped fuel
the popularity of asset sales.
Scarlet-lettered auctions do not enjoy a speed premium. Speed kills
value in these cases. Instead, we have a speed discount, and mass tort victims
must bear it.
2. The Consequences of Cautionary Bidding and the Speed Discount
Residual stain theory allows scholars to address one of the key
questions in the brave new world of mass restructurings: how great is the
discount attributed to bids for tainted assets? We currently lack data to
formulate an answer, but I suspect that this discounting will cause the bids
at auction to fall well below any reasonable seller’s reservation price.
Outside of bankruptcy, the auction would not go forward, but as explained
above, reserve pricing is irrelevant in many of these bankruptcies. These
dynamics set up a disastrous scenario.
I theorize that the risks of auction withdrawal and cautionary bidding
will be understated in scarlet-lettered bankruptcies. Path dependence will
lead debtors to pursue an asset sale merely because a traditional
reorganization is completely infeasible. There is no reserve pricing in these
auctions. The bankruptcy court will approve bidding procedures that blindly
adopt an English auction and otherwise chill bidding. The unique dynamics
that infect scarlet-lettered auctions cause widespread auction withdrawal,
and the winning bid—assuming there is one—is well below fair market
value. The court will approve the results on the false premise that the assets
were properly exposed to the market and the resulting price must be
recognized as fair market value; no consideration will be given to whether a
delayed sale would have produced a significantly improved price.
Diminished funds flow into the victims’ settlement trust, the linchpin of the
entire bankruptcy case.
Embedded in this scenario is the heightened risk that the settlement trust
will be prematurely insolvent and victims with ostensibly identical claims
will receive vastly different recoveries, even though the only material
difference is the timing of their manifestations of harm. The most overlooked
facet of this process is that there is no backstop if the trust becomes insolvent

133
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prematurely.134 The debtor is liquidated and no longer exists. Insurance
companies, the parent entity, and affiliated entities all receive releases
through the plan. If the debtor’s assets were auctioned, the acquirer does not
assume any pre-petition liability. The Future Claimants Representative
(FCR),135 who may have agreed to a poor settlement, has complete immunity.
Claimants who did not receive actual notice of the case cannot predictably
rely on procedural due process arguments. Constructive notice and the
FCR’s involvement most likely satisfy due process because the procedures
are reasonable under the circumstances.136 Bankruptcy’s dirty little secret is
that no one stands behind a failed trust.137
A doomed auction, however, is not the only option.
3. Value Rebound
The bankruptcy process attracts a cavalcade of distinct entities but then
ostensibly offers only two resolution options for viable businesses. These
options are impactful in most cases, but scarlet-lettered bankruptcies demand

134

The victims’ settlement trust in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy is the most prominent example.
By the early 1990s, trust administrators realized that the trust had insufficient assets to pay prospective
claimants the full value of their claims. Consequently, the trust was allowed to begin paying claimants a
pro rata share of the liquidated value of their claims based on a percentage set by the trust. The percentage
was initially set at 10% in 1995 but is currently only 5.1%. See Claims Resol. Mgmt. Corp., 2002 Trust
Distribution Process: May 2021 Revision 17 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); telephone
conversation by Javier Jose Daza Rossi with a representative of the Asbestos Claims Rsch. Facility at the
Claims Resol. Mgmt. Corp. (May 31, 2022); see also Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 260–
61 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the exhaustion of a class action settlement fund led to claimants challenging
the settlement on due process grounds), aff’d by an equally divided court in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S.
111 (2003) (per curiam).
135 The Future Claimants Representative is an individual appointed to represent the interests of future
victims in mass restructurings. This individual arguably helps satisfy due process strictures, but the
impartiality of the individual has been questioned:
The idea that the FCR would fail to be a zealous advocate may seem confusing at first but emerges
with shocking clarity when one considers the capture risk involved in mass tort cases. A small
pool of professionals manages the universe of mass tort bankruptcy cases, and the process is
characterized by repeat players. FCRs receive significant fees and, once appointed, immediately
hire as legal counsel the law firm at which they are a partner, thereby amplifying the benefit.
Therefore, the promise of multiple engagements is a truly distortive incentive for these
individuals. This promise can incentivize an FCR to discount her invisible clients’ interests. FCRs
seeking subsequent engagements face extreme pressures to avoid taking positions in one case that
may alienate key parties who will be involved in future cases.
Parikh, supra note 18, at 38–39 (footnotes omitted). I have also argued that “a bankruptcy court should
be authorized to remove an FCR after appointment if the court determines that the change is necessary to
ensure adequate representation of claimants.” Id. at 44; see also Sergio Campos & Samir D. Parikh, Due
Process Alignment in Mass Restructurings, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 6),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4088836 [https://perma.cc/DTK5-63D8].
136 See Campos & Parikh, supra note 135, at 17–23.
137 See supra note 24.
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a novel approach. What if we could defer the bankruptcy auction to capture
a potential value rebound?
Residual stains may not be inveterate. In a new paper, Professors Jordan
Neyland and Kathryn St. John argue that with highly volatile assets, the value
added by a delay can in many cases far outweigh any incremental asset value
decline.138 Recall that the predominant argument to justify the speed
premium is that the assets being sold face consistent value deterioration in
bankruptcy. This argument overlooks the potential for a meaningful rebound
in certain cases. Recent studies indicate that a value rebound is a significant
possibility in many accelerated auctions.139 As explained by Professors
Neyland and St. John, “[e]ven at a 10% annual rate of value decline, the
effect on shareholders’ and creditors’ value from the extension of time
significantly exceeds the effects from asset value decline.”140 They further
argue that if asset values are volatile, there is greater potential for shareholder
gains by waiting.141
In scarlet-lettered bankruptcies—for which asset values are uniquely
volatile—the speed discount is exaggerated, and victims can lose even more
value than in typical cases. Naturally, in many traditional bankruptcy cases,
value deterioration is dramatic and uninterrupted. Even a multi-year delay
would not improve yield. In these cases, the speed premium justifies an
accelerated asset sale. But the situation is hardly as ubiquitous as
debtors and secured creditors would have bankruptcy courts believe. More
important, I argue that this will not be the typical scenario for scarlet-lettered
companies.
As noted above, with court permission, an asset sale can occur outside
the debtor’s ordinary course of business and without creditor consent—even
though key creditors are often encouraging the auction. Courts need only
determine that a valid business justification supports the sale.142 Courts
consider numerous factors in making this assessment, including whether the
assets at issue are depreciating in value, but courts never consider the
possibility of a value rebound if the sale is delayed for some period of time.143

138

Neyland & St. John, supra note 40, at 6.
See id. at 5–6; see also Franks et al., supra note 61 (pointing to value rebound due to buyers being
more efficient users of the resources than the previous owners).
140 Neyland & St. John, supra note 40, at 5.
141 Id. at 6.
142 See id. at 25.
143 See id. at 5 (“In Chrysler, the court uses the ‘melting ice cube’ theory to justify a 363 sale, as the
going concern value of the company was in steep decline. This focus on asset depreciation in the court’s
opinion, arguably, dominates the decision to proceed with a 363 sale under the business justification
standard.” (citing In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009))).
139
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Could a deferred auction—perhaps months or even years down the
road—be the obvious solution for scarlet-lettered companies? This idea may
sound too good to be true, and in fact it is. A deferred asset sale offers the
potential of capturing the value rebound. This adjustment, however, is only
part of the solution because a mere delay is not sufficient by itself to remove
residual stains and rebuild customer and investor relationships. Furthermore,
scarlet-lettered bankruptcies involve unique creditor groups, including
current victims, future victims, state governments, and federal agencies. In
order to avoid liquidation and secure the various prizes the process offers,
debtors need support from these stakeholders.144 In fact, bankruptcy’s
collaborative ethos also includes the bankruptcy court, which must approve
unique forms of relief and the ultimate resolution design. A mere delayed
sale cannot address all these demands.
As explored below, the second key part of the resolution puzzle
involves the entity that emerges from bankruptcy.
B. Public Benefit Companies and Stakeholder Primacy
For the last half-century, U.S. businesses have embraced shareholder
primacy—the idea that a company’s sole purpose is to prioritize shareholder
profits to the exclusion of customers, stakeholders, and communities.145
Courts have reinforced this approach with threats of personal liability for
directors who deviate from the course.146 Nevertheless, the approach is still

144 A debtor could try a customary asset sale, but without stakeholder consent, there will be extensive
intercreditor battles regarding distribution of proceeds. The bankruptcy court will not approve the debtor’s
resolution measures without a material level of creditor consent. Furthermore, a traditional Chapter 11
reorganization is similarly futile because a mere rebranding will not remove the residual stain, see
Elizabeth A. Smith & Ruth E. Malone, Altria Means Tobacco: Philip Morris’s Identity Crisis, 93 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 553, 554–55 (2003), and creditors are highly unlikely to support a restructuring with dim
prospects of returning value.
145 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 679–82 (2007);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441
(2001); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise
is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”); see also Andrew
Ross Sorkin, How Shareholder Democracy Failed the People, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/business/dealbook/business-roundtable-corporateresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/4PM5-LY58] (“For nearly a half-century, corporate America has
prioritized, almost maniacally, profits for its shareholders. That single-minded devotion overran nearly
every other constituent, pushing aside the interests of customers, employees and communities.”); Milton
Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—the Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-socialresponsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/W87N-AVUG].
146 Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV.
733, 751 (2007).

459

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

controversial.147 Professor Lynn Stout and others have argued that long-term
corporate viability is premised on considering the triple bottom line:
stakeholders, the environment, and the community. Their foundational
premise is that relentlessly maximizing value for oneself—regardless of the
cost to others—is anathema to a properly functioning society. Similarly, a
corporate law model that compels directors through fiduciary duty
obligations and the threat of personal liability to take only actions that
maximize shareholder value—regardless of the cost to stakeholders and
communities—is anathema to an optimal, long-term business framework.
Professor Colin Mayer argues that shareholder primacy erodes long-term
value maximization of the corporate entity.148
An assessment of shareholder primacy is beyond this Article’s scope,
and such an assessment is unnecessary to resolving scarlet-lettered
bankruptcies. In 2013, just as a decades-old debate regarding shareholder
primacy was reinvigorated, the Delaware legislature muted the vitriol by
enacting a statute authorizing entities to organize as companies for the public
benefit.149 Companies interested in pursuing the triple bottom line—
stakeholders, the environment, and community—now had an alternative
from the most prominent corporate venue in the country. Under the new
statute, directors at Delaware public benefit corporations are mandated to
consider stakeholders alongside shareholders.150 More specifically, directors
must balance (1) shareholders’ pecuniary interests, (2) the best interests of
all other groups who are materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and (3) the specific public benefit or benefits identified in the certificate of
incorporation.151 To be clear, a public benefit corporation is not a nonprofit.
It is merely a traditional corporation that has a profit motive alongside
community and environmental objectives. This entity’s design allows for
147 See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 31–45
(2018) (arguing that “an excessive focus on shareholder returns or stakeholder interests” is one reason
“[w]e have lost trust in corporations”); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 13–60 (2012); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635, 1639 (2009)
(“[E]nhanced share price is at best a byproduct of activity that, as I will argue, has distorted the productive
incentives of corporate management to the potential long-term harm of American industry.”); Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 783–96 (2005) (“To
at least some extent, shareholders value nonfinancial aspects of corporate activities . . . . Thus,
maximizing shareholder welfare is not the same thing as maximizing shareholder profits.”).
148 See MAYER, supra note 147, at 44.
149 Delaware Enacts Benefit Corporation Legislation, FOLEY HOAG LLP (July 23, 2013),
https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2013/july/delaware-enacts-benefit-corporationlegislation [https://perma.cc/YRB5-38EN].
150 See Leo E, Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 235, 243 (2014).
151 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2022).
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accommodating the interests of various parties, as captured in the
incorporating documents. Despite their recent vintage, Delaware public
benefit corporations benefit from the fact that Delaware corporate law is
widely accepted among institutional investors, corporate managers, and
various intermediaries who raise capital.152
The public benefit model offers a third option for scarlet-lettered
companies in bankruptcy. An accelerated bankruptcy auction overlooks the
possibility of a value rebound and creates a level of discounting that threatens
to eviscerate the fundamental tenets of victim recovery. The idea of a
traditional reorganization is attractive, but the vehicle necessary to animate
that form needs approval from victims and the bankruptcy court. The
reorganized entity must reestablish its reputation among customers and
investors and still address the myriad issues that caused mass harm. A public
benefit corporation can fulfill that directive and act as a bridge to a final sale
of the business three to five years after the bankruptcy case—a time when a
full value rebound has a greater chance of materializing.
The next Part explains the public benefit proposal’s structure and
key facets.
III. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT PROPOSAL
Part II highlighted the resolution deficiencies that scarlet-lettered
companies will experience in bankruptcy, the results of which are
prematurely insolvent trusts and unsatisfied victims’ claims. A deferred
auction can alleviate this quandary when coupled with a reorganized entity
that has the ability to secure stakeholder buy-in and facilitate a value
rebound. The public benefit proposal assembles these disparate pieces to
formulate an innovative resolution option designed to equitably compensate
mass tort victims.153
One way to conceptualize the public benefit proposal is to analogize to
a criminal forfeiture.154 Imagine a small criminal syndicate has committed
violent crimes and used various vehicles to transport illegal drugs. Key
syndicate leaders are arrested and convicted. The vehicles are seized in a
criminal forfeiture. Selling the vehicles at fire-sale prices is an option. The
authorities could, however, repurpose the vehicles and use them in the
government’s fleet, which would provide a public benefit.
152

See Strine, supra note 150, at 243.
My proposal is not premised on the bankruptcy court identifying a debtor as a “scarlet-lettered
company.” Rather, I urge victim and creditor committees to consider the public benefit proposal when
they believe it offers an improved recovery outcome.
154 Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afms/types-federalforfeiture [https://perma.cc/5THG-WFJJ]. I thank Marshall Huebner for suggesting this analogy.
153
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This simple analogy aligns features of criminal activity in two very
distinct spheres but still overlooks a key aspect of mass tort resolution. A
general public good is a potential benefit of my proposal, but the primary
focus is to compensate those directly harmed by tortious conduct.
A. Objectives and Key Facets of the Public Benefit Proposal
At its core, the public benefit proposal formulates a modified
reorganization and deferred auction that utilize a public benefit corporation
to secure stakeholder buy-in and cleanse tainted assets. The framework has
two primary objectives. First, the public benefit proposal must offer a
process and timeline to efficiently155 dispose of scarlet-lettered assets. If
successful, there is an increased likelihood that the second objective—a
sufficiently funded settlement trust156—will be realized and avoid a
significant number of victims having absolutely no recovery option.157 As
discussed above, mass-restructuring cases to date have provided no financial
backstop for a settlement trust that becomes prematurely insolvent. This
raises the risk that victims of the same mass tort whose claims are resolved
through the same claim aggregation process will experience materially
different recoveries based on the temporal characteristics of their respective
claims. The public benefit proposal must not allow the timing of when harm
manifests be dispositive as to the level of recovery to which a victim is
entitled. This second objective addresses disparate treatment across victim
classes that include current victims and future victims.158
There are three key facets to the public benefit proposal that increase
the likelihood of fulfilling these primary objectives: allocating the delay

155 As noted above, for purposes of this Article, a bankruptcy auction is “efficient” if it is unlikely
that an alternative choice would produce a higher realized price and increased distribution to creditors.
Supra note 41.
156 A sufficiently funded trust should not be construed to mean that all victims receive full
compensation for meritorious claims; rather, the phrase should be understood as describing a trust that
has sufficient resources to pay all victims the predetermined fractional value of their claims, as established
by the plan of reorganization.
157 A sufficiently funded trust also mitigates the risk of uncompensated future victims arguing that
the settlement process did not satisfy procedural due process, claims that, if successful, could threaten to
unwind key aspects of a seemingly successful reorganization. See Campos & Parikh, supra note 135, at
30–31 (explaining how the bankruptcy process is vulnerable to due process claims).
158 Future victims have been affected by tortious conduct but may not exhibit harm for years or
decades. Individuals exposed to asbestos present a good example of this phenomenon, but the dynamic
exists in other contexts, including sex-abuse cases. I acknowledge that not all scarlet-lettered bankruptcies
will have future victims, but this is always a risk when injuries have material latency periods. This will
certainly be an issue in the bankruptcy case of LTL Management, Johnson & Johnson’s talc subsidiary,
and cases involving brain cancer stemming from excessive wireless device use. See Parikh, supra note
18, at 10 (explaining the divergent interests of current and future victims in mass tort cases).
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premium to victims, emerging from bankruptcy as a public benefit
corporation, and ensuring governance safeguards.
B. Allocating the Delay Premium to Victims and
Avoiding Prematurely Insolvent Trusts
My proposal seeks to address the objectives outlined above by creating
a delay premium and then allocating funds directly to the victims’ trust.
Conceptually, creating a reorganized corporation for the public benefit
reduces to an acceptable level ex post residual stain risk and defers auctions
to a time when bidder discounting no longer precludes assets from realizing
fair market value. The public benefit proposal offers a philanthropy shield
behind which tainted assets can be cleansed. Over time, the residual stain
evaporates, and the new corporation can conduct an auction when the value
rebound has been fully realized, ideally within three to five years.
The presence of a delay premium may be underappreciated. Part II
discussed research involving the delay premium and how sales of volatile
assets create significant discounting. In volatile-asset cases, delaying an
auction for one year can increase equity value by over 15%; delaying it two
years can increase equity value by over 25%.159 Shareholders and other
parties dependent on auction proceeds can capture one-quarter of a firm’s
value by simply opposing a rushed sale and advocating for a deferral,
assuming the resolution process allows this option.160 For cases involving
tainted assets, the premium could be much larger.
The valuation analysis in Purdue offers insight into the potential
magnitude of the delay premium. For plan confirmation, a debtor is required
to hire third-party professionals to produce a financial analysis that
determines the most likely recovery for different creditor classes if the debtor
were liquidated.161 These assessments capture three key points (high,
medium, and low) in the recovery range.162 Numerous assumptions underlie
these assessments, including that (1) the asset sale is orderly163 and designed

159

See Neyland & St. John, supra note 40, at 5.
See id.
161 This analysis is necessary for plan confirmation because § 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code
imposes the “best interests” test, which restricts a court from confirming a plan of reorganization unless
the plan provides that each holder of an impaired claim who does not otherwise vote in favor of the plan
receives property of a value that is not less than the amount that such holder would receive if the debtor
were liquidated. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); see PATRICK A. MURPHY, CARRIE V. HARDMAN & DAVID
NEIER, CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 17:13 (2d ed.).
162 See Purdue Disclosure Statement, supra note 122, app. B at Ex. 1.
163 In Purdue, the assumption was that assets could be liquidated over a period of up to one year. See
id. app. B at 2 (“The Liquidation Analysis assumes that the Trustee would wind down and monetize the
Assets of the Debtors over a twelve-month period . . . .”).
160
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to secure the highest realized price under the circumstances, and
(2) ostensibly all of the corporate assets and litigation claims will be part of
the sale.164
In Purdue, AlixPartners prepared this analysis and concluded that a
rushed sale of the company would be disastrous for victims, generating no
payment to victims in the low-recovery scenario, and virtually no recovery
in the middle-recovery scenario.165 The high-recovery scenario offered an
aggregate recovery of only $699 million.166 These results were then
compared to a valuation analysis of Knoa, the reorganized public benefit
company that is expected to emerge from the bankruptcy case.167 The
variance is staggering.168 Based on Purdue’s historical performance, Knoa’s
future prospects, industry trends, and national and international market
dynamics, AlixPartners estimated that approximately $5.5 billion will be
distributed on account of victim claims under the plan.169 This amount is
nearly 800% greater than the likely maximum aggregate recovery on account
of those claims in a high-recovery liquidation scenario.170
Naturally, this analysis is subject to uncertainties and contingencies.
Nevertheless, understanding outcome probabilities is extremely useful in
financial decision-making. Creditors regularly rely on these types of
analyses, bolstering the idea that the assessments have material

164

See id.
See id. app. B; Notice of Filing of Debtors’ Third Revised Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order Confirming the Eleventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Purdue
Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 41, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2021) [hereinafter Purdue Debtor’s Proposed Findings of Fact].
166 See Purdue Disclosure Statement, supra note 122, app. B, at Ex. 1; Purdue Debtor’s Proposed
Findings of Fact, supra note 165, at 41.
167 On November 18, 2020, Purdue entered into a plea agreement with the Department of Justice that
obligates Purdue to reorganize as a public benefit company or an entity with a similar mission. See
Debtors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation of Debtors’ Sixth Amended Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Debtor Affiliates and Omnibus Reply to Objections
Thereto, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) [hereinafter Purdue
Memorandum of Law]. Knoa’s ultimate entity form is unresolved. The order confirming Purdue’s plan
of reorganization was appealed and recently vacated, see Rick Archer, Purdue Pharma’s Ch. 11 Plan is
Unraveled on Appeal, LAW360 (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1449669/purduepharma-s-ch-11-plan-is-unraveled-on-appeal [https://perma.cc/SVZ2-7W73]), but that does not affect the
potential benefits of the plan’s features. Purdue has appealed the district court’s ruling. See Vince
Sullivan, Purdue Ch.11 Appeal Can Go to 2nd Circ., NY Judge Rules, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2022),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1453543/purdue-ch-11-appeal-can-go-to-2nd-circ-ny-judge-rules
[https://perma.cc/G2VL-5AA7].
168 See Purdue Memorandum of Law, supra note 167, at 150.
169 See id.
170 See id.
165
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value. In Purdue, victims gave this analysis considerable weight, voting
overwhelmingly to approve the plan.171
A successful deferred auction creates a premium that can be allocated
to victims through the settlement trust. This structure can avoid a wealth
transfer from victims to the fortunate bidder who happens to win a rushed
auction. Once these dynamics are understood, there is a strong incentive for
victims to seek delay. The premium may not approach the number expected
in the Purdue bankruptcy, but the need to consider the possibility of this
premium is clear.172
C. A Corporation for the Public Benefit
As I have written before, “[t]here is a certain level of equitable balance
in a company that has done evil being reorganized to solve that evil.”173 This
idea is a key part of the projections noted above, and why the public benefit
model improves value and offers the possibility of a windfall for victims. I
argue that a scarlet-lettered company that rejects past criminality and pursues
rehabilitation can shed the residual stain. This transformation improves
relationships with consumers and investors, mitigating public scorn and
social-norm effects. The public benefit model enhances the likelihood of this
result by allowing parties to easily impose covenants and other governance
safeguards to ensure that management fulfills the restorative and
philanthropic objectives that encouraged stakeholder buy-in. As noted
above, public benefit companies are policed in a unique way to ensure that
they fulfill their missions.174 I argue that this fact helps assure stakeholders,
consumers, and investors that the company has undergone a sincere
metamorphosis as opposed to a disingenuous rebranding.175
1. Windfall Profits
As discussed above, bankruptcy auctions frequently fail to maximize
revenue for the bankruptcy estate.176 This inefficiency diminishes proceeds
for creditors. On the other side of this dynamic, the purchaser who has
171

More than 95% of the approximately 120,000 submitted votes were in favor of approving the plan
of reorganization. See id. at 158; see also In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26, 36–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
(noting that all five primary victim groups believed that a Purdue sale would produce virtually no recovery
for the victims).
172
The proceeds from the ultimate auction of the public benefit company are not the only funds in
the victims’ settlement trust. The trust will invariably be funded by contributions from affiliated entities
and insurance companies. Current victims do not have to wait three to five years to begin receiving
recoveries from the trust. Proceeds from the auction supplement the trust corpus.
173 See Parikh, supra note 114, at 71.
174 See supra Section II.B.
175 See Smith & Malone, supra note 144, at 555.
176 Supra Section I.A.
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secured assets at a below-market price is well-situated to enjoy windfall
profits. In a typical case, the value rebound occurs when an auctioned
company realizes the fair market value it enjoyed prior to an episodic value
decline. Further along that spectrum, the “windfall” occurs when value
continues rising to an unpredicted level, yielding an unexpected profit for
shareholders. The public benefit proposal attempts to shift this windfall—to
the extent one materializes—to victims, the new owners of the reorganized
company.
Going back to a sin-company example, the Station Casinos asset sale
captures the advantages this equity position presents. The casino group that
would ultimately become Station Casinos was founded by Frank Fertitta Jr.
in 1976. Frank’s two sons partnered with Colony Capital to take the business
private in 2006.177 In the throes of the Great Recession and facing multiple
exogenous market factors, Station Casinos filed for bankruptcy in 2009 with
$6.5 billion of debt.178 The company valued its casino properties at $5.7
billion, but these assets were certainly volatile, and in an industry that had
been decimated by consumers shifting away from gaming activities.179 The
debtors moved for a quick sale of the enterprise. Casino assets were
auctioned in conjunction with a plan of reorganization.180 The Fertitta
brothers—the existing owners—were the winning bidders, leading a
group of insiders181 who contributed a mere $772 million for the debtor’s
valuable assets.182
Just five years after the sale, the Station Casinos enterprise was worth
$3.5 billion, almost five times the realized price from the bankruptcy
auction.183 On April 26, 2016, the Fertittas took Station Casinos public under
177 Joy Noel, Station Casinos Look to Sell Part of Their 380-Acre Development Land Sites, BEST US
CASINOS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.bestuscasinos.org/news/station-casinos-look-to-sell-part-of-their380-acre-development-land-sites/ [https://perma.cc/K9CX-VHEC].
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See Disclosure Statement to Accompany Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Station
Casinos, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors (June 15, 2010), In re Station Casinos, Inc., No. BK-09-52477
(Bankr. D. Nev. June 15, 2010).
181 The other primary equity owners were the company’s main secured lenders. See Julie
Triedman, After Two Rocky Years, Station Casinos Exits Bankruptcy, AMLAW DAILY
(June 20, 2011, 5:25 PM), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/06/stationcasinosexit.html
[https://perma.cc/USS9-97ZK].
182 See Judge OKs Station Casinos Bankruptcy Exit Plan, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2010, 3:48 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/stationcasinos-bankruptcy/judge-oks-station-casinos-bankruptcy-exitplan-idINN2710205520100827 [https://perma.cc/F3VT-S6N2].
183 Christopher Palmeri, Fertitta Brothers Said to Weigh Share Sale for Station Casinos,
BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015, 6:27 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/fertittabrothers-said-to-weigh-share-sale-for-station-casinos [https://perma.cc/BF9N-JECM]; Howard Stutz,
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the name “Red Rock Resorts,” and captured a windfall.184 In some respects,
the Fertittas established their own deferred auction before selling their casino
empire to the general public. In late 2021, Red Rock Resorts enjoyed a $6
billion market capitalization.185
During the Great Recession, many creditors—primarily corporate
bondholders—demonstrated risk aversion by willingly accepting a
diminished upfront payout in distress situations.186 None of the key creditors
in the Station Casinos case objected to the asset sale to the Fertittas.187 But
keep in mind that these parties enjoy this flexibility because they have
invariably hedged their exposure, secured insurance, purchased the debt at a
significant discount, or installed other safety nets to minimize the impact of
losses.188 Sophisticated creditors are prepared to absorb the speed discount
and frequently do. But victims in scarlet-lettered bankruptcies are not
so lucky.
An equity position in a reorganized company undoubtedly brings risks
in addition to benefits for mass tort victims. I argue, however, that the risks
are manageable. Through the bankruptcy process, the debtor’s capital
structure has been heavily scrutinized, and many systemic issues are
resolved. These factors, coupled with the governance safeguards outlined
below and the staggering level of discounting in scarlet-lettered auctions,
justify the idea of victims waiting for a value rebound with the possibility of
a windfall.189
2. Securing Stakeholder Buy-In
As noted in Part II, scarlet-lettered bankruptcies are unique in a number
of ways. One distinguishing characteristic is the creditor body involved. The

Station Casinos’ Corporate Name Will Be Red Rock Resorts After IPO, L.V. REV.-J. (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/station-casinos-corporate-name-will-be-red-rock-resorts-afteripo/ [https://perma.cc/WHY7-AANS].
184 Palmeri, supra note 183; Stutz, supra note 183.
185 Market Capitalization of Red Rock Resorts (RRR), COMPANIESMARKETCAP (July 2022),
https://companiesmarketcap.com/red-rock-resorts/marketcap/ [https://perma.cc/N6P9-RQKF].
186 Unsecured bondholders in the Station Casinos case did receive a 15% equity stake. Triedman,
supra note 181.
187 See John G. Edwards, Station Casinos Receives OK for Sale, L.V. REV.-J. (Aug.
6, 2010, 9:44 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/station-casinos-receives-ok-for-sale/
[https://perma.cc/3QZ4-6CPE].
188 See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, From Vulnerable to Sophisticated: The Changing Representation
of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 123, 168 (2019) (describing how
sophisticated creditors have tools to “take matters to their hands” to protect their financial interests).
189 The Bankruptcy Code’s original design attempted to include mass tort victims in future asset
appreciation, but that statutory design failed in practice. See Parikh, supra note 18, at 48 (discussing the
intent of § 524(g) and explaining how parties easily circumvented the equity allocation that was to be
afforded to victims). The public benefit proposal revives this idea.
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typical scarlet-lettered bankruptcy will involve current and future victims,
state governments, and federal agencies. These are not the creditors seen in
most large Chapter 11 cases. They bring a distinctive set of demands, and
debtors need their support to avoid liquidation and secure the various prizes
the process offers.190
The public benefit proposal is premised on a deferred auction. The
public benefit corporation that emerges from the case allows victims to
capture the value rebound by providing a philanthropy shield behind which
a tainted business can be cleansed. In a traditional reorganization, the debtor
emerges as a new corporation. But this change could be perceived to be a
mere rebranding, which would not lift residual stains for scarlet-lettered
companies. Without a value rebound, a deferred auction creates the worst
option for scarlet-lettered companies.
The public benefit model must enhance the likelihood of stakeholder
buy-in. As explored in Section III.D, infra,191 state law allows for the
imposition of rigorous governance safeguards that ensure that new directors
maintain fidelity to the corporation’s (1) financial goal of ultimately
regaining enough value to sufficiently fund the victims’ trust; and (2) societal
goal of assisting the direct and indirect victims of the debtors’ tortious
conduct. Some may question how much value victims would place on
governance safeguards, but the public benefit model’s effect was clear in
Purdue. In that case, the five key creditor groups representing a host of
victims all stressed that settlement was possible because of the shared vision
they had with the debtor to provide a mechanism to help direct and indirect
victims of the opioid crisis and a belief that this vision could actually be
fulfilled.192
Bankruptcy’s collaborative design also requires bankruptcy court buyin. The court must approve the ultimate resolution framework and various
forms of essential relief, including complicated nonconsensual, third-party
liability releases and a modified automatic stay protecting nondebtor
parties.193 The support of victim groups plays a large role in these cases
because the bankruptcy judge will give considerable weight to the

190

Supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.D.
192 See In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that the five primary
victim groups that had voted overwhelmingly in favor of the debtor’s plan had been persuaded by the
“tremendous public benefit that will be realized by implementing the Plan’s many
forward-looking provisions”).
193 See id.
191
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preferences of this sympathetic group in making key rulings in the case,
including the decision to confirm the debtor’s proposed resolution.194
D. Governance Safeguards
The delay premium and stakeholder buy-in are both contingent on the
new public benefit corporation fulfilling financial and societal goals. The
proposal’s third key facet involves relying on public benefit covenants and
statutes to ensure fidelity to the new corporation’s mission.
Delaware state law195 allows the bankruptcy court and other
stakeholders to impose rigorous governance safeguards on public benefit
companies. This feature is particularly important for scarlet-lettered
companies because the debtor has already committed significant
transgressions that may be attributed to corrupt executives but could also be
the byproduct of operating in an industry where unethical conduct has been
normalized.
As noted above, a public benefit corporation’s certificate of
incorporation can explicitly delineate stakeholders that directors must
consider in decision-making processes.196 Even without this feature, the
Delaware code requires directors to balance shareholders’ pecuniary
interests with the best interests of all other groups who are materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct.197 Delaware law allows planners to demand198
a high level of fidelity to the overarching public benefit mission.199 Fiduciary
duties in this context are not explicitly defined, but directors are required to
balance wealth maximization against the interests of corporate
194

See In re Purdue Pharma, L.P, 633 B.R. 53, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (explaining the
importance of victim groups’ overwhelming support to the court’s decision to confirm the plan).
195 Delaware state law and court system are the preeminent authorities on corporate law and enjoy a
unique level of familiarity with institutional investors, corporate managers, and other intermediaries. See
Strine, supra note 150, at 243. This Section will assume that the reorganized public benefit corporation
will incorporate in Delaware, but the conclusions reached hold regardless of the state of incorporation.
See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 381 (2017) (noting that
benefit-corporation legislation “is based, to a greater or lesser extent, on Model Legislation drafted for B
Lab Company”).
196 Supra note 149 and accompanying text.
197 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2022). Under the code, a public benefit “means a positive
effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or
interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects
of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious,
scientific or technological nature.” Id. § 362(b).
198 Section 367 affords shareholders an explicit right to bring derivative actions, even though their
for-profit brethren must rely on Delaware common law. See id. § 367.
199 For example, a pharmaceutical company focused on maximizing public health rather than profits
would be transformative in addressing the litany of problems that plague the U.S. healthcare marketplace.
The same broad societal benefits could also be realized in other industries.
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stakeholders.200 Section 365(a) of the Delaware Code is explicit on this point,
and section 365(b) arguably imposes liability for decisions that are merely
unreasonable—a meaningful departure from the for-profit construct.201
Underneath this umbrella, the ultimate design has relatively simple
mechanics. The new public benefit corporation (“NewCo”) should acquire
the profitable assets owned by the debtor prior to bankruptcy.202 NewCo’s
certificate of incorporation should mandate that directors consider current
and future mass tort victims as well as other stakeholders that the court
orders. Governing documents can also dictate how NewCo will operate. For
example, in Purdue, the governing documents provide for the creation of a
new public benefit company called Knoa that must (1) fundamentally
operate for the public benefit, (2) consider long-term public health interests
relating to the opioid crisis in its decision-making processes, and (3) employ
transparent and sustainable management practices.203 Knoa must make
medicines available to treat opioid addition and reverse opioid overdoses.
Flexibility under Delaware state law allows the court-approved plan to
dictate how directors will be selected and apportion representative power
across victim groups.204 The plan can also dictate director qualifications,
which could be relevant depending on the industry in which the new entity
will operate. Adding a further level of protection, the plan can require that a
monitor be appointed to act as a type of independent board overseeing the
directors. This monitor is an extension of the court and should be tasked with
reviewing NewCo’s compliance with its corporate covenants and applicable
bankruptcy court orders. The monitor selection process can be established
by the debtor and approved by the court after consultation with
victim groups.205
Finally, the governing documents should establish a terminal date.
After all, the proposal is built upon the idea of a deferred auction designed
to capture a value rebound. NewCo’s directors could be afforded the
discretion to seek an auction within some set period of time, perhaps three to

200

See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 96 (2017).
See id. at 96−97.
202 We can look to the Purdue bankruptcy for guidance. See Twelfth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R.
26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) [hereinafter Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan]. As noted above, the order
confirming the plan of reorganization was appealed and recently vacated, see supra note 167, but that
does not affect the potential benefits of the plan’s features.
203 Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan, supra note 202, at 22−23 (defining “NewCo Governance
Covenants”).
204 Supra notes 195–196 and accompanying text.
205 Naturally, the process should not mirror the deficient FCR selection process. See Parikh, supra
note 18, at 36−39.
201
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five years. In the alternative, a fixed sell-by date can be established with the
possibility of a one-year extension to afford directors some flexibility.
Governing documents should provide for the distribution of proceeds, most
of which should be directed to victims or settlement trusts.206
All these statutory provisions work together to encourage victim groups
and other stakeholders to take a leap of faith and support a restructuring effort
premised on a longer-than-expected commitment to a mass tort villain.
CONCLUSION
There is a scholarship vacuum at the intersection of aggregate litigation
and bankruptcy, but this is also the epicenter for the most meaningful and
challenging legal issues today. Throughout the last decade, aggregate
litigation scholarship ignored the possibility that bankruptcy represented an
optimal resolution process. Mass-restructuring cases in the last few years
highlight the consequences of that oversight: mass tort victims face
exploitation. My public benefit proposal is one step in an effort to address
this wrong by enhancing victim recoveries.

206 The potential value of this model does not necessarily end at the auction, though. A Delaware
public benefit corporation is not subject to the Revlon ruling, which holds that “concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object
no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.” See Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). This means that directors
of NewCo would not be obligated to sell the corporation to the bidder offering to pay the highest price.
In selecting a winner, directors could consider whether the buyer planned to continue the corporation’s
lofty mission. See Strine, supra note 150, at 245−46.
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